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REGULATING DYNAMIC RISK IN CHANGING
MARKET CONDITIONS
SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, ANNE TUCKER, & YUSEN XIA*
ABSTRACT

How successful are the SEC's attempts to regulate dynamic
risk in financial markets? Using mutual fund disclosure data from
two financial shocks-the Puerto Rican debt crisis and COVID19-this Article finds evidence that SEC open-ended regulations,
like the obligation to disclose changing market conditions, are largely
successful in capturing dynamic, future risk. Funds engage in widespread and, often, detailed disclosures for new risks-although
these disclosures vary widely in specificity. But not all funds disclose new risks. This creates perverse incentives for funds to opt
out of disclosure or downplay threats with boilerplate language
when new risks are emerging. This Article recommends several
SEC interventions to improve dynamic risk disclosures including
empirically monitoring disclosures, issuing guidance when problematic variation is observed, and enforcing disclosure standards.
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INTRODUCTION

How does the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC')
write dynamic regulations that protect markets and investors today in the face of tomorrow's unknown risks? 1 Disclosure is the
dominant regulatory tool2 for both operating companies efirms"),
which issue securities,a and mutual funds (''funds"), which pool
money from many investors to purchase a portfolio of securities. 4
Disclosures are designed to create transparency about past performance and address uncertainty about future outcomes.5
The SEC's disclosure regime obligates securities issuers to divulge sufficient information to facilitate the SEC's
regulatory oversight. 6 Firms, for example, must file initial public offering ("IPO") registration statements and comprehensive, ongoing reporting, like 10-Ks.7 Funds file a registration
1 Dynamic regulation has been described as financial regulation defined
by future events, moving beyond mere reaction and ''increasingly utiliz[ing]
institution-specific and decentralized information reflecting preceding events
and attempting to anticipate succeeding future contingencies." Wulf A. Kaal,
Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 791, 818--19 (2013).
• For a discussion on the lristory of SEC regulation by disclosure, see Henry
T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation,
and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 565, 586-90 (2014)
(describing the eight decades-long SEC reliance on the "descriptive mode of
information'' as regulation).
8 Securities are broadly defined by the Securities Act of 1933 and generally
encompass a variety of investment products. See Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S. C. § 77b(a)(1).
• SEC, lnvestor.gov, Mutual Funds: What Are Mutual Funds?, https://www
.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/mu
tual-funds-and-exchange-traded-1 [https://perma.cc/E6YM-UZT5].
5 For a history of the SEC disclosure regime see Business and Financial Dis·
closure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,918--21 (Apr. 22,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249).
• See, e.g., Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85
Fed. Reg. 63726 (Oct. 8, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, and
240) [hereinafter S-K Final Rules].
7 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2012). Regulation S-Kis
the set of rules that primarily implements the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-229.1200 (2018). The Securities Act
of 1933 adopts a regime of full disclosure to protect investors, as opposed to a
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statement and update prospectuses at least annually, among
other requirements.s
The SEC does not always prescribe precise actions or issue
clear prohibitions.9 For example, the SEC requires disclosure of
certain categorical information like statements about principal risks
facing firms and funds,lD Firms and funds must satisfy these
principles-based regulations by determining exactly what they
must disclose at the time of filing. 11 This determination changes
over time depending on the social, political, and economic conditions. Responsive disclosures that change as circumstances and
markets change are one piece of dynamic regulation. 12
Within the flexibility of the SEC disclosure regime, however, some information is mandated,l3 For example, funds must
regime regulating the merits of any particular investment (as the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) does with new medicines, for example), on the
theory that "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see also Gregg J. Jarrell, The Economic
Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 613, 622 (1981) (''Its legislated purpose is to protect investors from insufficient or misleading information, rather than to protect or to prevent them
from choosing risky securities.").
8 Form N-1A, Registration Statement of Open·End Management Invest·
ment Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 239.15A (2021) [hereinafter SEC Form N·1A],
https://www .sec.gov/files/formn·1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV68·WWVK].
9 See, e.g., S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 6 (''Many of the amendments
reflect our long·standing commitment to a principles-based, registrant·specific
approach to disclosure. Our disclosure requirements, while prescriptive in some
respects, are rooted in materiality and facilitate an understanding of a registrant's business, financial condition and prospects ....'}
1o See, e.g., SEC Form N·lA, supra note 8.
" See, e.g., S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 6 (noting "principles-based"
nature of amendments to Regulation S-K).
12 See Kaal, supra note 1.
'"This Article refers to SEC rules with formalistic and clear mandates as
rules-based regulations. For a discussion of the regulatory clloices between rules
and standards, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (Donald R. Harris et a!. eds.,
1992) (describing a ''pyramid" of enforcement strategies ranging from self·
regulation to command regulation with nondiscretionary punishment); James
W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the Court in the Law of Taxation,
99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 265--66 (1995); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 65 (1983).
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clearly state that investing entails the risk of losing money.1 4 The
SEC also sets parameters like page limits, plain English mandates,
and formatting standards to make disclosures more accessible to
ordinary investors.1 5 Once again, hard rules are balanced with
flexibility. Funds, for instance, must disclose "essential information about the Fund in a way that will help investors to make
informed decisions about whether to purchase the Fund's shares
described in the prospectus."16 Taken together, the SEC's disclosure regulations create a flexible framework within which firms
and funds comply with clear rules while also exercising discretion about what information is disclosed and how.17
But regulation by disclosure is, by its nature, incomplete.
The SEC can require disclosure of known or ongoing risks, but
what of new and emerging risks? To address ex ante uncertainty,
the SEC adds open-ended features that extend disclosure obligations to future, unknown events.lB In particular, the SEC requires
funds to provide information on changing market conditions that
present new and undisclosed risks to the funds' investments. 19
Changing market conditions identify unusual, imminent, or unfolding events that could adversely impact the fund by introducing
additional risk.20 These events include political developments
like a change in power, economic conditions like a recession, or
legal events such as new legislation or court rulings that may
affect the markets broadly, a sector such as oil and gas, or a
specific locale.21
See, e.g., SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8 (reqlriring all non-Money Market
funds "disclose that loss of money is a risk of investing in the Fund").
15 Presentation of Information in Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (''To
enhance the readability of the prospectus, you must use plain English principles
in the organization, language, and design of the front and back cover pages,
the summary, and the risk factors section.").
1s SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8.
17 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S- K, supra
note 5.
1a S-K Final Rules, supra note 6.
19 SEC, Investment Management, Guidance Updnte: Fund Disclosure Reflecting
Risks Related to Current Market Conditions, 2016-02 (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter
Current Market Conditions], https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2016
-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/C69G-DC6N].
20 See id.
21 See id.
14
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Open-ended requirements, such as the requirement to disclose changing market conditions, regulate dynamic risk.22 Such
prescriptions act as a gap-filler or a bridge between what the SEC
knows to regulate today and what the SEC may need to regulate
tomorrow. 23 For example, the SEC cannot know when, where,
and to what extent the next hurricane will disrupt the economy
of Florida or Puerto Rico. Nor can the SEC predict when and how
the next pandemic will impact the global economy. A mandate to
proactively disclose emergent market conditions addresses the
shortcomings of more traditional, static regulations.24
The ability to regulate dynamic risk in a cost-effective25 and
responsive way26 is both difficult and necessary.27 This Article
argues that the SEC's attempt to regulate dynamic risk through
requiring funds to disclose emerging market conditions is largely
successful (with a few caveats). Using a dataset of all open-end
mutual fund principal risk disclosures from 2010 through 2020,
this Article examines how funds disclosed the risk associated
with two major changing market conditions that occurred in the
22 See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and A Postscript Assessment
of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 27 (2014).
23 Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology Is Faster Than the Law?, 6 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 561, 590 (2017).
24 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19.
25 Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 621 (1992) (stating that standards are less costly than rules when
the "behavior subject to the law is infrequent''); see also RoNALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28, 71-80 (1977) (using clifferent language but
exploring standards versus hard rules in litigation).
26 See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 24 (2000) (providing a behavioral
economics treatment of rules versus standards).
27 To review articles critiquing reactionary financial regulation see JILL M.
HENDRICKSON, REGULATION AND INSTABILITY IN U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING:
A HISTORY OF CRISES, 231, 242-43 (2011) (discussing increased regulation
and increased instability in the commercial banking industry); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1022-27,
1078-79 (2012) (critiquing reactionary legislation); Gary Gorton & Andrew
Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 2010 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 262 (advocating for further and more flexible financial regulation); Kaal, supra note 1, at 818-19 (arguing for dynamic regulation of
financial systems).
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past decade: the Puerto Rican debt crisis and the emergence and
effect of the COVID-19 global pandemic.28 This Article fmds that,
in general, funds respond to the SEC's mandate to disclose changing market conditions. 29 In other words, many funds disclose
their exposure to COVID-19 or Puerto Rico's deteriorating economic
condition and describe how these events may affect the fund's
value. 30 However, not all funds disclose changed or changing market conditions. 31 These funds' disclosures read like 'business as
usual,' even when it is not.32 And within the funds that do disclose changing market conditions, descriptions of a serious emerging risk can vary wildly from disclosure to disclosure, even among
similarly invested funds talking about similar events. sa
Such widespread but incomplete participation coupled with
disclosure variation raises questions about the efficacy of SEC
dynamic risk regulation and presents opportunities to improve it.34
The disparity in funds' descriptions of current market condition risk also hinders the SEC's goal of keeping ordinary investors informed. 35 Variation likely creates confusion for investors by
signaling differences in funds' risk exposures where none may
exist. 36 Assume two similar funds are both invested in Puerto
Rican debt in 2015. Fund A provides a detailed description of the
Puerto Rican debt crisis and how it may affect the fund's net asset
value (NAV). At the same time, Fund B provides some generic
language about the fund's exposure to municipal bond markets,
including Puerto Rico's.
This example is not hypothetical: it exists in the data. Does
the disparity between Fund A's and Fund B's disclosure affect how
consumers compare the funds? Probably. The specificity provided
by Fund A suggests that it is more exposed to and will suffer more
See infra Section II.B.l; Section liLA.
See infra Section II.B.2; Section liLA.
so See infra Section ILB.3; Section III.A.
"' See infra Section II.B.2; Section liLA.
32 See infra Section IILB (describing the effect of boilerplate language that
"state hypothetical risks without a clear signal to investors that they are, in
fact, exposed to specific risks from the investment in Puerto Rican securities'}
33 See infra Section ILB.4.b.
84 See infra Part IV.
35 See infra Part IV.
86 See infra Part IV.
28
20
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negative consequences from Puerto Rico's debt crisis than Fund
B. Fund B's use of generic language obscures the serious nature of
the risk in more neutered language that communicates a common,
benign risk. Disclosure variation, in this case, is not necessarily
a reflection of parties' unvarnished predictions about future legal, economic, and political conditions. The funds make strategic
choices about how to disclose certain risks both to maximize share
sales to investors and minimize regulatory scrutiny and legal liability. Variation may mislead investors into underestimating the
current market conditions' impact on the fund. 37
This lack of consistency is not limited to the Puerto Rican
debt crisis.as COVlD-19 disclosures in 2020 show the same disparity in disclosure participation and specificity. as
This Article argues that the SEC can ameliorate this shortcoming by providing targeted guidance once new market risks
are in play. In 2016, the SEC issued guidance on how to describe
the Puerto Rico debt crisis.40 In that year, more funds disclosed
the Puerto Rican risk and more did so using specific language
about the crisis and the risk. 41 The SEC's necessary intervention
helped investors by standardizing disclosure and funds' description of this emerging risk. 42 SEC guidance normalized disclosing
the risk and minimized the threat that fulsome disclosure will
scare offinvestors.43
At this point, the careful reader may be asking themselves,
''Why focus on funds?'' First, funds as regulated entities are understudied compared to firms.44 Few scholars have examined how
funds communicate with regulators and investors. Yet key differences between firms and funds increase the importance of fund
disclosures from a regulatory perspective. 45 First, mutual fund
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section III.A.
39 See infra Sections II.B.2-4.
40 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 354--63.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 386--88.
48 See infra text accompanying notes 529--31.
44 A Westlaw search for secondary sources with "mutual fund/s", "institu·
tiona! investor'', or ''fund" in the title produces 388 articles, whereas the same
searclt for articles witlt "corporation'', "corporate" or ''firm" in the title produces
nearly 2,000 responses.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 46--50.
37
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boards of directors are virtually powerless. 46 Second, unlike firmissued securities, a fund's NAY is not subject to any indirect
price control mechanisms, such as price arbitrage. 47 In the absence of other points of formal or informal control, SEC disclosure emerges as the primary pillar of mutual fund oversight. 48
Reliable oversight matters to the over 102 million Americans who
are invested in funds, saving for long-term goals like education
and retirement. 49 Further, mutual funds are the largest shareholder in public companies. 5o
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides some necessary background by outlining funds' disclosure requirements,
with a focus on the obligation to disclose changing market conditions. 51 It also describes how open-ended regulations cover unforeseen risks extending today's regulations to tomorrow's crisis. 52
Part II examines the concept of dynamic risk through the
lens of the COVID-19 pandemic.53 Using funds' disclosures of
COVID-19 related investment risk provides a case study to explore the efficacy of the SEC's open-ended regulations for regulating dynamic risk. 54 From the data, this Article concludes that
such regulations are largely successful in bringing changing
market conditions to light. 55 However, many funds do not disclose
changing market conditions, and even among those that do, there
is a great deal of variation in the specificity with which funds
describe these risks. 56
See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J.
84, 118 (2010) ('There is very little evidence of [mutual fund] boards challenging
fund managers over any significant issue.").
47 Holger Spamann, Indirect Investor Protection: The Investment Ecosystem and Its Legal Underpinnings, 1046 IIARV. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW,
EcoN., & Bus. 14 (June 20, 2021).
48 Id. at 14--23 (discussing indirect investor protections).
49 Id. at 80.
50 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, ICI FACTBOOK 83 (2021), https://www
.ici.org/system/files/2021-05/2021_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNS8-VBDZ]
(stating that mutual funds hold thirty percent of U.S. public equities).
51 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
53 See infra Part II.
54 See infra notes 214--30 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 323--24 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 268-81 and accompanying text.
46
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Part III examines disclosures dealing with a past changed
market condition: the Puerto Rican debt crisis. 57 Again, the data
show variation in both disclosure and specificity.5B This Article
finds that after the SEC issued specific guidance about the impact
of Puerto Rico's default on municipal bond debt, funds responded
with more disclosures and more specificity.59 Additionally, this Article also traces fund disclosure differences to portfolio differences. 60 Funds that made specific disclosures about the Puerto
Rican debt crisis were more heavily invested in the island than
those that issued only boilerplate. 61
Part N draws from a rich contracts literature to construct
a three-tiered typology of disclosure specificity when describing
dynamic risk.62 This Article argues that the SEC can improve
compliance with its open-ended requirement to disclose changing market conditions by applying this framework and empirically evaluating the content and distribution of disclosure type. 63
In particular, this Article offers specific strategies that would
allow the SEC to better monitor compliance with both the letter
and the spirit of the regulation.64 Finally, this Article outlines
conditions when SEC intervention, such as providing additional
guidance to funds, would be especially useful. 65

I. MUTUAL FUND DISCLOSURES
The SEC regulates funds much like it regulates firms:
through disclosure requirements. 66 This Part first reviews the
SEC's regulatory framework for mutual fund disclosures. 57 Section LA provides an overview of the regulatory framework governing mutual fund disclosures.6B Section I.B examines statutory
and regulatory disclosure rules requirements designed to increase
57 See infra Part III.
•• See infra Part Ill.
59 See infra notes 358--63 and accompanying text.
so See infra notes 396--97 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 396--97 and accompanying text.
62 See infra Part IV.
63 See infra notes 557-58 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 557-58 and accompanying text.
65 See infra notes 527-44 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 73--82 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 73--74 and accompanying text.
6B See infra Section I.A.
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fund transparency.ss Section I.C discusses principles-based regulations, which set the standards by which funds determine whether
to discuss a principal investment risk. 70 Section I.D introduces the
SEC's open-ended regulations to address dynamic risk through a
requirement to disclose changing market conditions. 71 Here, SEC
guidance on changing market conditions is reviewed, including
examples of past events that triggered the disclosure obligation,
and examples of SEC enforcement. 72

A. Regulated Disclosures
Both funds and firms are covered by the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 73 In addition,
funds are governed by the Investment Company Act of 1940.74
Mutual funds must comply with a suite of regulations. 75 At the
•• See infra Section I.B.
10 See infra Section I.C.
71 See infra Section I.D.
72 See infra Section I.D.
n See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78a.
74 Congress created the SEC to regulate the American securities market
with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and designed it "to restore investor confidence" in the markets.
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2017)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2017)); see also What We Do,
SEC, https:/lwww.sec.gov/aboutlwhatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/38JP-NXRN].
In 1940, Congress again acted to pass the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act to regulate companies, including investment companies
(commonly called mutual funds) and the investment advisers that manage
mutual funds. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54
Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2017)); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2017)). For a complete discussion of
the regulatory landscape, see Anita K Krug, Downstream Securities Regulation,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1589, 1599-1611 (2014) [hereinafter Downstream Securities] (discussing the major financial services regulations and application to mutual funds).
76 Downstream Securities, supra note 74, at 1591. The word "governed" is
used loosely here. Funds face less onerous disclosure requirements than firms
and even fewer affirmative regulations on their internal operation. Wolf A
Kaal and Bentley J. Anderson summarized the regulatory landscape for mutual
funds as follows:
[T]he Company Act commits the mutual fund to: (1) register as
an investment company under the Company Act; (2) comply with
detailed periodic governmental reporting and investor disclosure
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heart of this regulatory scheme lies requirements for mandatory
disclosure. 76 Disclosure serves the SEC's goals of informing investors, facilitating capital formation through asset pricing and
allocation, and preventing fraudulent and abusive practices. 77
Disclosures also offer regulators an elegant solution to ex·
ante prescriptions for complex industries and actors--rather than
dictating what funds can or cannot do, such regulation emphasizes procedural transparency as a moderating force.7B The SEC's
disclosure framework79 contains clear mandates or rules, so principles·based regulationsB1 with room for discretion, and open·
ended standards to accommodate future events.B2
duties; (3) comply with structural and trading·related obliga·
tions (including, among others, restrictions on the fund's abil·
ity to invest in certain securities industry related issuers, and
on its ability to short sell and engage in leveraged transac·
tions); (4) redeem investors' shares at their net asset value
(NAV) on demand and promptly pay the proceeds of there·
demption; (5) disclose the fund's diversified or non·diversified
investment strategy; and (6) disclose the fund's policy on in·
vestment concentration.
Unconstrained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection, 36 REv. BANKING &
FIN. L. 817, 830 (2017) (citing to 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a·1(b)(1)-(3), (5), (7); 80a
·8(b)(1)(E)).
76 Downstream Securities, supra note 74, at 1591.
77 Robert A. Robertson, In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus,
54 Bus. LAW. 461, 466 (1999) (citing to FRANCIS WHEAT, DISCLOSURE To
INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER
THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 10 (1969)). The mutual fund disclosure system is built
on the corporate disclosure system and incorporates many of the objectives
served by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 465; see also Joseph A. Franco, A
Consumer Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the Limits of
Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 10 (2009) (characterizing SEC
disclosure laws as eliminating abusive forms of marketing and ensuring access to
increasingly simplified disclosures aimed at an unsophisticated investor).
78 Downstream Securities, supra note 74, at 1623--25.
79 Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual
Rules, 3 S. CAL.INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 18 (1993) (arguing for the need to have both
rules and principles·based disclosures).
so Dan Awrey, William Blair, & David Kershaw, Between Law and Mar·
kets: Is There A Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 191, 219-20 (2013) (describing rules·based regulations).
81 Marianne Ojo, Basel ill-Responses to Consultative Documents, Vital As·
pects of the Consultative Process and the Journey Culminating in the Present
Framework (Part 1), 30(9) BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'¥REP. 13, 26-27 (2011).
B2Id.
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The current configuration of dynamic fmancial regulation
emerged in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Analysts and
regulators realized that additional flexible and future-looking
regulations were necessary to avoid future similar crises. 83 Dynamic regulation "attempt[s] to anticipate succeeding future contingencies."84 In other words, dynamic regulations seek not only
to fix the broken gate that allowed the dog to escape but also to
build a better gate.
The flexibility characterizing principles-based, dynamic regulation stands in stark contrast to more traditional rules-based
regulations.B5 Rules-based regulations are prescriptive, top-down,
and formulaic. sa In other words, such regulations can devolve into
a "check-the-box'' exercise.s7 The SEC itself describes rules-based
regulations as employing ''bright-line, quantitative or other thresholds to identify when disclosure is required."BB These bright lines
Kaal, supra note 1, at 800. Reactionary legislative approaches write regulations based on yesterday's problems, often failing to anticipate tomorrow's
problems. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 1022--27, 107S-79 (describing the shortcomings of reactionary legislation). Many scholars have pointed out the shortcomings of this approach. See id; Kaal, supra note 1, at 800 (discussing the
problems with rules-based regulation); Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities
Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55 McGILL L.J. 257,
298 (2010) [hereinafter Principles-Based Securities Regulation] (making the
argument for dynamic regulation after the financial crisis in 2007); Fenwick
et al., supra note 23, at 590 (arguing for dynamic regulation to deal with innovation); Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579,
582-83 (2019) (arguing that ''the regulatory sandbox is a form of principlesbased regulation because firms participating in the sandbox will be given
flexibility and discretion in adapting their innovation to comply with the
enumerated goals of the sandbox regime").
84 Kaal, supra note 1, at 81S-19.
85 Principles-Based Securities Regulation, supra note 83, at 273.
ss Id. at 269--70.
87 Cristie L. Ford, Financial Innovation and Flexible Regulation: Destabilizing the Regulatory State, 18 N.C. BANKING lNST. 27, 29 (2013) [hereinafter
Financial Innovation] (describing dynamic regulation as attempting to steernot row-the ship and contrasting it with top-down approaches in rules); see
also Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, S-8 (2008) (illustrating the dllference between
rules and principles using a speed limit example of "do not drive over 45
mph" versus "do not drive an unreasonable speed for the conditions"); Awrey
et al., supra note 80, at 219--20 (describing rules-based regulations).
88 S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 63747.
88
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can lead to creative efforts to evade the regulation.B9 Principlesbased regulations, on the other hand, are flexible, responsive and
can be individualized based on the context of the regulated party. 90
Unlike rules-based regulations, principles-based regulations
prescribe certain actions and anticipate evolution. 91 They establish
the floor, or minimum, while providing flexibility to grow with new
circumstances.92 Materiality standards are a good example of such
regulations.93 The SEC requires regulated entities to disclose the
material risks of investment.94 For funds, this translates into the
principal risks to which the fund is exposed.95 The framework allows registrants to "determine (I) whether certain information is
material [or principal], and (II) how to disclose such information."96
SEC guidance around principles often focuses on non-exhaustive,
illustrative lists of the types of information that should be considered material and therefore disclosed.97 Open-ended regulations
that mandate disclosure if something happens in the future are
a particularly dynamic form of principles-based regulations. 98
Such flexibility is not without its drawbacks, however. 99
Without hard and fast disclosure rules, funds may be uncertain
about exactly what to disclose and when.1°0 This can lead to variation in the content or specificity of disclosures.1o1 The SEC
may also struggle to uniformly police compliance.1o2 The brightline nature of rules-based regulations, on the other hand, make
/d.
oo Ojo, supra note 81, at 13, 26--27.
91 Kaal, supra note 1, at 819.
92 ld. (argujng that dynamic regulation helps regulators adapt to new circumstances).
98 S·K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 22.
94Jd. at 20.
95 See, e.g., S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 17 (discussing materiality for
firms); see SEC Form N·1A, supra note 8 (illustrating materiality for funds).
98 S·K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 81.
97 See, e.g., id. at 81-85.
98 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2.
99 See Ojo, supra note 81, at 27.
100 Id. at 11.
1o1 See infra Part II (discussing the variation in funds' disclosure of COVID·19associated risks).
1o2 See Ojo, supra note 81, at 13, 20-21 (discussing the trade·offs of principles
-based approaches like lack of certainty and lack of transparency for the public).
89
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it easier to comply and enforce_I03 But funds still may engage in
creative non-compliance or evasion.l04 Moreover, ease of enforcement comes at the expense of completeness and responsiveness.1° 5
Rules can become obsolete, whereas dynamic regulations can extend to the future. 106 The trade-offs are significant between the
two approaches and thus why the SEC uses both.1° 7

B. Rules-Based Disclosures: Fund Registration and Annual
Disclosures
Funds must provide information to the SEC and the public
in an initial registration, which must be updated at least annually.108 Funds disclose this information in Form N-1A.1°9 This form
serves as both the initial registration statement, which is necessary to offer shares for sale to the public, and the annual update
(i.e., the prospectus). no In the prospectus, funds to disclose the principal fund's investment strategy, resulting risks, fees charged,
past returns, management information, minimum investment,
tax information, and a description of intermediary payments.1 11
Funds file the disclosures with the SEC for review, but
the intended audience is the average investor without sophisticated legal or financial knowledge.1 12 Information provided by a
1oa Id. at 15.
104

Id. at 23.

1oo Id. at 15.

Id.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 4.
1oa Both initial filings and prospectus updates are done through the SEC
form N-1A. W. John McGuire, Registering Investment Companies under Form
N-lA, MUTUAL FuNDs TODAY: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS, CW009
ALI-CLE (2014).
109 Id.
11o Both initial filings and prospectus updates are done through the SEC
form N-1A. McGuire, supra note 108.
111 See SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8 (establishing the requirements of the
fund prospectus).
112 Id.
The prospectus disclosure requirements in Form N -1A are intended to elicit information for an average or typical investor
who may not be sophisticated in legal or financial matters. The
prospectus should help investors to evaluate the risks of an investment and to decide whether to invest in a Fund by providing
106
107
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fund should (1) "help investors to evaluate the risks of an investment," (2) "decide whether to invest in a Fund by providing
a balanced disclosure of positive and negative factors," and (3)
"assist an investor in comparing and contrasting the Fund with
other funds." 113
Another prescriptive and rules-based element is the tiered
disclosure structure.1 14 Form N-1A has three distinct components:
the Summary Prospectus (Items 2-8), the Prospectus (Items 1, 913), and the Statement of Additional Information or SAl (Items
14-27).115 The three-tier structure shields investors from information overload116 by automatically providing only the summary
prospectus, while making the other tiers available on request
and through publicly hosted websites_117
Within the prescribed disclosure framework, however, funds
exercise discretion about what information to disclose and how
to disclose it. 11B For example, empirical work on mutual fund disclosures found that disclosures routinely vary in length, readability, and sentiment between funds.1 19 Further, funds exercise
a balanced disclosure of positive and negative factors. Disclosure

in the prospectus should be designed to assist an investor in

comparing and contrasting the Fund with other funds.
Id. at ii-iii.
11a Id. at ii-iii.
114 Id. at 6.
115 Id.; see also McGuire, supra note 108. Mutual funds are subject to additional SEC f":tling requirements as well as annual and semi-annual financial
statements, which are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., SEC, INv.
MGMT. Drv., Letter to Karrie McMillan, Esq., General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute, 5-6 (July 30, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions
/investment/guidance/ici073010.pdf (discussing disclosure obligations beyond
the prospectus) [https://perma.cc/5PY6-38L6].
116 See 0MRI BEN-SHARAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 1-2 (2014) (describing the
limitations of mandatory disclosure for consumers confronting information
from many different sources competing for their attention).
m SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8, at 30.
11s Id. at 1.
119 Anne M. Tucker & Yusen Xi.a, The Promise & Perils of Plain English
Mutual Fund Disclosures 13-14 (working paper, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436952 [https://perma.cc/ZU6P-PZTM]; Anne
M. Tucker, Yusen Xia, & Susan Navarro Smelcer., Text, Tone, and Legal Language: Analyzing Mutual Fund Disclosure Sentiment 4-5 (working paper, 2021)
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discretion when providing categorical information like principal
risks and investment strategies and when complying with openended regulations like changing market conditions.1 20 Each is
discussed in more detail below.1 21

C. Principles-Based Regulations: Disclosing the Fund's Principal
Risks
Mutual fund investors need to know about the risks of investing in a fund, but the precise information necessary will vary
between different funds.1 22 Acknowledging this variation, the SEC
employs a principles-based standard requiring funds to summarize the principal123 strategies, risks, and returns of investing in
a given fund (Item 4(a)).124 Item 4(a) provides a summary of how
the fund invests money pooled from the investors,l25 In Item 4(a),
funds identify the types of securities and assets it buys for the
portfolio,l26 Funds also describe important investment policies like
limits on how much the fund can invest in a certain region, type
of asset (e.g., growth stock or emerging market stock), industry
(e.g., energy), or sector (e.g., commodities),127 This information helps
investors distinguish one fund's investment opportunity from
[hereinafter Text, Tone, and Legal Language], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3674572 [https://perma.cc/63UP-AQ67].
120 Text, Tone, and Legal Language, supra note 119, at 21.
121 See infra Sections I.C, D.
122 William Hinman, Applying a Principles-Based Approach to Disclosing
Complex, Uncertain and Evolving Risks, SEC (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www
.sec.gov/news/speech/hinman-applying-principles-based-approach-disclosure-03
1519 [https://perma.cc!BZ4N-4VBX]. In the context of firms, the SEC recently
justified a principles-based approach "where the relevant information tends
to vary greatly across companies, because, in these situations, the more standardized prescriptive requirements are less likely to elicit information that is
tailored to a specific company." S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 84-85.
123 This Section starts a confusing discussion where the SEC uses principlesbased disclosure regulations (i.e., flexible and discretionary) to elicit a fund's
principal (i.e., main) investment strategies and risks. Hinman, supra note 122.
124 SEC Form N-lA, supra note 8, at 9. Item 4 ''Risk/Return Summary: Investments, Risks, and Performance'' focuses on investment strategies and risks
of funds.
120 Id.
126 ld.
121 Id.
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another's_12B The SEC sets the parameters, and funds must provide information that meets the stated intent of informing ordinary investors about the major risks of investing in the fund. 129
Investment risk flows from a given investment strategy.l 30
Funds must summarize the principal 131 risks associated with a
fund's investment strategy in Item 4(b) (''Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund").1 32 The Item requires funds to disclose known
risks associated with the portfolio and "the circumstances reasonably likely to adversely affect the fund's net asset value, yield,
and total return."133 In this principles-based disclosure, the SEC
shapes but does not dictate the precise disclosure requirements.134
Instead, the SEC places the responsibility on funds to describe
the principal risks for investors_135
To comply with principles-based disclosures, funds exercise discretion about what information to disclose and how to do
itJ36 Discretion produces a range in the quantity and quality of
the information disclosed.1 37 In 2019, the SEC provided additional
guidance to improve the quality of principal risk disclosures. 138
The SEC encouraged (but did not mandate) funds to warn that
Id.
Presentation of Information in Prospectuses, supra note 15.
1so SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8, at 9.
131 Hinman, supra note 122.
13.2 SEC Form N-lA, supra note 8, at 6. Item 4 ''Risk/Return Summary: Investments, Risks, and Performance'' focuses on investment strategies and risks
of funds.
188 Id.; see also McGuire, supra note 108, at 1-2.
134 SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8, at 9.
135 There is a growing acknowledgment that the regulators do not have the
best or most current information and instead rely on the regulated actors to
share the information necessary to facilitate regulation in the face of changing conditions. Dynamic regulation "accept[s] that state regulators do not
always have the same access to or quality of information as regulated actors"
and tries to ''regulate at a distance." Financial Innovation, supra note 87; see
also Principles-Based Securities Regulation, supra note 83, at 261 (making similar arguments).
186 SEC, DIV. INV. MGMT., DISCLOSURE REV. & ACCT. OFF., ADI 2019-08lmproving Principal Risks Disclosure (2019), https://www.sec.gov/investment
/accounting-and-disclosure-informationlprincipal-risks/adi-2019-08-improving
-principal·risks-disclosure [https://perma.cc/E3YH·K786].
137 ld.
188 Id.
128
129
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some investments are not appropriate for certain investment objectives_139 The SEC also encouraged funds to order risks by importance, tailor the risk disclosures for each fund in a fund family
rather than rely on boilerplate, and provide a concise summary
of risks.1 40 Notably, the SEC emphasized these changes should
be made with an eye towards individual investors.1 41

D. Open-Ended Regulations: Changing Market Conditions
Even with rules--and principles--based regulations, funds'
disclosure of risk is incomplete.1 42 The approaches discussed above
require substantive disclosures of known risks.1 43 But these regulations are silent on unknowable future risks.1 44
The SEC supplements its rules-and principles-based
regulation with open-ended regulations, such as a requirement
to disclose changing market conditions.1 45 Funds must disclose new
risks created by previously undisclosed changing market conditions that may negatively and seriously impact a funds' investments.146 Changing market condition obligations amplify existing
requirements that dictate funds should already monitor disclosed investment risks 147 to determine if they "remain adequate
in light of current conditions."14B Monitoring market conditions
is a part of prudent portfolio management by the adviser, so funds
are expected to routinely engage in that practice as a "normal
part of day-to-day operations."149 Funds should disclose new risks
discovered through market monitoring in the next scheduled filing
Id.
Id.
141 Id.
142 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2.
143 Id. at 1.
144 Id. at 2.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2.
147 Cf. John L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk
Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 403--04 (2010)
(arguing that because the SEC does not require a likelihood estimate, firms
should disclose all possible risks and uncertainties to avoid any potential liability or enforcement action from omission).
148 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2.
149 Id. Funds may disclose the new risks with the next prospectus or file an
amended prospectus if the current one would be "materially misleading." Id. at 3.
139

140
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or an amendment if its omission would be "materially misleading."150 By keeping disclosures tied to current market realities,
the SEC seeks to encourage "more timely, more meaningful, and
more complete" risk disclosures_151
Clear obligations to extend principles-based risk disclosure to future events creates the regulatory flexibility necessary
for the regulated entity and the regulator to adapt to new circumstances.152 The open-ended feature invites a primary critiquethat such regulations are so vague as to be meaningless to the
regulated entity and impossible to enforce by the regulator.1 53
Periodic guidance from the SEC can help funds determine
whether specific social, political, or economic events constitute a
changing market condition_154 The SEC's Division of Investment
Management issued guidance on changing market conditions
(for funds) in 2016.155 The guidance addresses future risks and
funds' responsibility to identify and interpret the effects of
emerging or changing market forces as well as assess conditions
that continue to change. 156 The SEC justifies funds' obligations
to disclose changing market conditions based on investors' informational needs.157
SEC staff also provide guidance on changing market conditions through comments to filed registration statements and
Id.
Id. at 3.
162 Fenwick et a!., supra note 23, at 590.
153 Ojo, supra note 81, at 13, 20-21.
164 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 3. Note that there is no
scholarship on the empirical parameters defining a changing market condition. This reflects the relatively small amount of academic attention paid to
mutual fund disclosures as compared to operating company disclosures, more
than it reflects the insignificance of cllanging market conditions. Henry Hu, The
New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the Public Corporation Model, 60 Bus. L. 1303, 1305-06 (2005).
155 The SEC staff issued guidance on "the importance to investors of full
and accurate information about fund risks, including risks that arise as a result of
changing market conditions." Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 1.
166 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2.
167 In the 2016 guidance, the SEC reminded funds of the ''importance to
investors of full and accurate information about fund risks, including risks
that arise as a result of changing market conditions." Id. at 1.
160
151
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prospectuses_15B Unsurprisingly, staff identified the 2008 financial crisis as a changing market condition warranting disclosure_159
In other years, several staff comments also identified new market
or economic forces that resulted in changes to portfolio valuations
and price estimates as a changing market conditions requiring
disclosure.1 60 SEC staff further defined issues related to portfolio
liquidity, 161 defensive positions, 162 and debt/equity ratios as changing conditions that required disclosure_Isa Finally, staff advised
SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8, at 1.
''Please include a section titled 'Municipal Bond Market Risk' to include
the current market conditions and risks that issuers are facing, given recent
financial hardships and losses of tax revenue." Eaton Vance Municipal Income
Trust, SEC Staff Comment (Form N-2) (Apr. 24, 2009); see also Crossroads
Liquidating Trust, SEC Staff Comment (Form N·2) (Mar. 13, 2009).
160 Prospect Capital Corp., SEC STAFF COMMENT, N·2, September 30, 2015;
Guggenheim Credit Allocation Fund, SEC STAFF COMMENT, N-2, July 13, 2012.
161 Brinker Capital Destinations Trust, SEC Staff Comment (Form N -1A)
(Nov. 30, 2016).
Please explain to us in detail how the Fund's board of directors
determined that these expected holdings are liquid (i.e., any investment that the Fund reasonably expects can be sold or disposed of in current market conditions in seven calendar days
or less without the sale or disposition significantly changing
the market value of the investment. See Investment Company
Act Release No. 32315 (Oct. 13, 2016) at III. C.4 (discussing
certain factors tltat a fund could consider in assessing tlte liquidity of its portfolio investments and providing guidance on
specific issues associated with each of these factors). Your re·
sponse should include general market data on the types of investments and data on the liquidity of specific investments of
the type that tlte Fund will invest in.
!d.
162 Avenue Mutual Funds Trust, SEC Staff Comment (Form N-1A) (Apr. 3,
2012).
Principal Investment Strategies of the Fund In your response
letter, explain the need for the apparent defensive language
depending on current market conditions and the Fund's outlook
over time. Does the Fund anticipate implementing a defensive
investment position frequently and/or for extended periods of
time? Disclose that tlte Fund is non-diversified. Clarify that a
repurchase agreement constitutes a lending by the Fund and
that a reverse repurchase agreement constitutes a borrowing by
the Fund.
!d.
163 Western Asset Middle Market Income Fund, Inc., Registration Statement
(Form N-2) (July 13, 2011).
158
169
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funds to disclose significant investments in the natural resource
sector experiencing fluctuations because of natural disasters and
climate change as changing market conditions.1 64
In addition to wider portfolio risks, SEC staff identified
several specific events that constituted a changing market condition.165 One example is the Puerto Rican debt crisis, 166 which
is empirically investigated in Part III.1 67 Beginning in the early
2010s, Puerto Rico became insolvent and began defaulting on municipal bond debt.168 Puerto Rico's debt crisis created significant
risk for fixed income funds invested in the island_l69
The SEC also has identified government policy as a changing
market condition_l70 For example, following the economic recovery
from the 2008 fmancial crisis, 171 the government ended quantitative
easing in 2015 and exposed fixed income funds to new liquidity and
interest rate risks, especially pertaining to long-duration securities_172 The end of the quantitative easing policy, which kept
164 SEC, GOEHRING & ROZENCWAJG INVESTMENT FuNDS FILE NOS. 333·
212686 AND 811-23177 4 (2016).
The disclosure on page 6 sets forth a ''Natural Resources Investment Risk''. Please add appropriate disclosure to the risk
factor to reflect how current market conditions in the natural
resources sector (e.g., downward trend in oil and gas prices)
may impact the Fund's investments. See 1M Guidance Update
2016-02 (March 2016).
!d.
165 See, e.g., Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 5.
1ss When Puerto Rico failed to make debt payments in 2015 and 2016, funds
investing in tax-exempt securities faced new risks. Id. Funds were required
to update their disclosures to specifically name Puerto Rico as an investment
location and some disclosed heightened risks of the investment such as downgrades in debt, negative market values, and illiquidity of fund securities. Id.
167 See infra Part III.
168 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 5.
169 See infra Part IV. This event is discussed in more detail using funds'
evolving disclosures as a case study in that Part.
11o Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 4.
171 FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY RELEASE, FEDERAL RESERVE ISSUES
FOMC STATEMENT (Mar. 18, 2015), https:l/www.federalreserve.gov/news events
/pressreleases/monetary20150318a.htm [https://perma.cc/SC8L-GX98]; FEDERAL
RESERVE MONETARY POLICY RELEASE, FEDERAL RESERVE ISSUES FOMC STATE·
MENT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/monetary20151216a.htm [https:l/perma.cc/ZJW9·HJNL].
172 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 4.
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interest rates near zero, changed market conditions, and required
disclosure.173 The SEC enforced the disclosure requirements in
staff comments to form N-lA asking fixed income funds to include
a risk discussion focused on ''interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and
duration risk ... in light of changing market conditions." 174
In the following Parts (II and Ill), this Article examines how
funds responded to open-ended regulations in their disclosure of
two changing market conditions: COVID-19 and the Puerto Rico
debt crisis_175

II. REGULATING DYNAMIC RISK: DISCLOSING
CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS

The SEC successfully regulates dynamic risk within a
disclosure-based regulation scheme when funds reliably identify and appropriately discuss realized or emerging investment
risks. This standard for regulatory success suggests a more fundamental question: when do events create new risk to funds that
warrant disclosure as a changing market condition? The ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic provides a case study_176 Section II.A discusses the events surrounding the emergence of COVID-19 and
its impact on financial markets.177 This Article argues that the
COVID-19 global pandemic meets the requirements of a changing market condition_178 Section II.B presents data on the explosion of public health disclosures in 2020, exploring the disclosure
content using hand labeling and topic model results.1 79
Id.
Id. at 3; Gabelli Healthcare and WellnessRX Trust, Registration State·
ment (Form N-2) (Apr. 5, 2017). Interest rate changes similarly affected real
estate funds. Citing the 2016 IM guidance, SEC staff directed USQ Core Real
Estate Fund to "disclose that rising interest rates can negatively impact the
value of real estate securities. Also, please disclose a separate interest rate risk
factor that sets forth the risks of changing interest rates on the Fund's portfolio." USQ Core Real Estate Fund File Nos. 333·217181 and 811-23219, SEC
Staff Comment 3 (2017).
175 See infra Parts II and III.
176 See infra Sections II.A and II.B.
177 See infra Section II.A.
17B See infra Section II.A.
179 See infra Section II.B.
178

174
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A. COVID-19 Market Conditions
In January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
first declared COVID-19 a world health emergency, and in March,
elevated it to a global pandemic. 180 The word ''unprecedented'' became a cliche tagline for anything associated with the pandemic,lBl
But heavy reliance of this word by the media, govemment officials,
and other organizations reflects the difficulty of conveying the
breadth and depths of COVID-19's disruptive effects in 2020,182
Little of modem life, the economy, or work remained the same once
the pandemic hit,lB3 Stock markets crashed immediately following
its emergence,lB4 Markets later rebounded with stimulus packages
and vaccine news,1ss only to slump again as new variants arrived,1B6
1ao Bill Chappell, Coronavirus: COVID-19 Is Now Officially a Pandemic,
WHO Says, NAT'L PuB. RADIO (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/11/8144 74930/COVID·19·COVID-19-is-now·of
ficiallya·pandemic·who-says [https://perma.cc/H6K3·FW6H]. For an overview
of the COVID-19 global pandemic, see JAMES K. JACKSON ET AL., CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R46270, GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COVID·19 (2021) [hereinafter
CRS COVID-19].
181 See, e.g., Blake & Wadhwa, 2020 Year in Review: The Impact of COVID-19
in 12 Charts, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Dec. 14, 2020), https:/lblogs.worldbank.org
/voices/2020-year-review-impact·covid·19·12·charts[https://perma.cc/22QK-D7GV].
182 See, e.g., notes 184--95 and accompanying text.
183 See, e.g., notes 184--95 and accompanying text.
184 Between February 14, 2020, and March 23, 2020, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost about one-third of its value. CRS COVID·19, supra note 180, at
14. Japan's Nikkei experienced a twenty-four percent drop between February 2,
2020, and March 12, 2020. Nikkei 225 Historical Data, YAHOO! FIN., https:/lfi
nance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EN225/history?period1=1580601600&period2=158
3971200&interval=1d&filter=history&frequency=1d&includeAdjustedClose=true
[https://perma.cc/B2CR-L2ZB]. China's Shanghai index dropped eight percent
in one day in February 2020, the largest single day drop in more than four years.
Karishma Vaswani, Coronavirus: China Shares in Biggest Fall in Four Years,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2020), https:/lwww.bbc.com/newslbusiness·51352535 [https://
perma.cc/EVB4-HKUR].
185 The Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA), along with other market
indices, rose nearly three percentage points on Monday, November 9, 2020, reportedly on news that a COVID·19 vaccine had been developed. CRS COVID19, supra note 180, at 14. During the period from November 3, 2020, through
November 24, 2020, the DJIA rose over nine percent. Id. On November 24,
2020, the DJIA, along with global equities markets, increased by 1.5 percent,
and reached an index milestone of 30,000. Id.
186 See Eric Platt & Colby Smith, Economists Trim Forecasts and Investors
Feel Jitters over Delta Variant, FIN. TiMEs (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.ft.com
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Unemployment soared early in the pandemic.1B7 Borders closed.lBB
Government lockdowns ensued_189 Schools went virtual190 and
entertainment shuttered.191 Major pillars of the economy like
/content/c21958ff-80d2-4b3b-863c-c492b361b2a4 [https://perma.cc/5FKP-PG8Y].
On January 31, 2020, President Trump signed a proclamation suspending
entry of non-citizens physically present in the People's Republic of China into
the United States. Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6, 709 (Jan. 31, 2020).
For a current list of travel restrictions to the U.S., see Ilona Bray, Coronavirus
Country-Based Travel Bans: Who Is Blocked From Entering the U.S.?, NOLO,
https:/lwww.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/coronavirus-travel-ban-who-is-blocked
-from-entering-the-u-s.html [https://perma.cc/H8QN-6XPQ].
187 From mid-March 2020 to early July 2021, nearly ninety million Americans ftled for unemployment. CRS COVID-19, supra note 180, at 10, 12, 13.
"[T]he OECD in July 2021 estimated the pandemic-related recession cost 22
million jobs in OECD countries in 2020 and that 114 million jobs had been lost
globally ...." Id. at 10 (citing to OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2021: NAVIGATING THE COVID-19 CRISIS AND RECOVERY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4 (2021) [hereinafter OECD], https://www
.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2021_5a700c4b-en
[https://perma.cc/J9HQ-V38E]).
188 See, e.g., CRS COVID-19, supra note 180, at 71 (discussing President
Trump's border closure with Europe in 2020); see also Michael Birnbaum, Europe
Is Closing Borders amid Covid-19 Outbreak. They May Be Hard to Reopen, WASH.
POST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/Europe/Europe
-closing-borders-coronavirus/2020/03117/131a6f56-67c8-11ea-b199-3a9799c54512
_story.html [https://perma.cc/5D5G-YPQQ] (discussing European border closures).
189 The World Health Organization estimated that 230 million Europeans
were living under lockdown restrictions in January 2021. CRS COVID-19,
supra note 180, at 82. To view global data on lockdowns and stay-at-home
orders, see Hannah Ritchie eta!., COVID-19: Stay-At-Home Restrictions, OUR
WORLD DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stay-home-restrictions [https:/1
perma.cc/HW82-ESVR].
190 Kevin McElrath, Nearly 93% of Households with School-Age Children
Report Some Form of Distance Learning During COVID-19, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/08/school
ing-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/PW9P-GZA5].
191 See, e.g., Greg Guibert & lain Hyde, ANALYSIS: COVID-19's Impacts
on Arts and Culture, COVID-19 RSFLG DATA AND AssESSMENT WORKING GRP.
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/COVID-Outlook-Week
-of-1.4.2021-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM2L.WHUG] (discussing the dire consequences for arts and entertainment in the US, and stating that Q3 of 2020
resulted in a fifty-three percent revenue decline); see also COVID-19: Cancellation of Public Events and Gatherings, OUR WORLD DATA, https://ourworld
indata.org/covid-cancel-public-events [https://perma.cc/YV8D-LBDV] (providing global data on cancelled public events).
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workforces,l92 supply chains, and consumersl93 were stressed as
over 184 million people globally fell ill and over four million died.l94
No industry was unaffected_l95
Using the framework laid out in the 2016 guidance,l96
COVID-19 clearly satisfied the elements of a changing market
condition. Disclosures that failed to inform investors of an invest·
ment affected by COVID would certainly be incomplete_197 The
novelty of the pandemic declaration, the global reach, and the dura·
tion all suggest the pandemic created a changing market condition
warranting disclosure for many, but not all, funds_l98
But the SEC never required funds to disclose COVID·19
risks, despite doing so for firmsl99 and recognizing that funds were
192 In April 2020, twenty million Americans lost their jobs because of busi·
ness lockdowns creating the highest unemployment rate (fourteen percent) since
the Great Depression. CRS COVID·19, supra note 180, at 13. The Interna·
tiona! Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that ninety·three percent of the
world's workers in January 2021 were living under some form of pandemic·
related workplace restrictions, and that the pandemic cut working time by an
equivalent of 255 million full·time jobs. Id. at 9.
193 See, e.g., OECD, supra note 187, at 2 (discussing supply chain impacts
and overall economy impacts); Christopher Rowland & Peter Whoriskey, U.S.
Health System Is Showing Why It's Not Ready for a COVJD.J9 Pandemic,
WASH. PoST (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy
/the·US·health·system·is·showing·why·its·not·ready·for·a·coronavirus·pandemic
/2020/03/04/7c307bb4·5d61·11ea·b29b·9db42f7803a7_story.html [https://perma
.cc/2AD2·FVN7J (identifying U.S. supply chain shortsges); THE BEIGE BOOK:
SUMMARY OF COMMENTARY ON CURRENT ECONOMIC CoNDmONS BY FEDERAL RE·
SERVE DISTRICT, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (June 2, 2021), https://www
.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BeigeBook_20210602.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M4TJ·Z2LC] (reporting continued supply chain stress in the United States).
194 CRS COVID·19, supra note 180, at 1 (showing infection and death rates
as of July 2021).
195 Chris Bradley & Peter Stumpner, The Impact of COVJD.J9 on Capital
Markets, One Year In, McKINsEY & Co. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.mckinsey
.comlbusiness·functions/strategy·and·corporate·finance/our·insights/the·im
pact·of·covid·19·on·capital·markets·one·year·in [https://perma.cc/8ZKN·P2KQ]
(describing sector and industry effects in the four phases of first year of the
pandemic).
196 See infra Section I.D.
197 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2, 3.
198 Id.
199 Coronavirus (COVJD.J9~Disclosure Considerations Regarding Operations, Liquidity, and Capital Resources, SEC, DN. CORP. FIN. (June 20, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/covid·19·disclosure·considerations [https://perma
.cc/6AUL·BA6Y].
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not immune to the effects of COVID-19.200 For example, the SEC
relaxed its rules on in-person fund board management meetings,
allowed for between fund-borrowing, 201 delayed delivery of fund
prospectus 202 and other information, issued investor fraud alerts
around the pandemic, 203 and published a COVID-19 response page
for funds on the SEC website.204
This Article examines which funds disclosed COVID-19 risks
and how funds discussed the risks associated with the pandemic.
In general, the data show a dramatic increase in public healthrelated disclosures in 2020.205 Some funds focused on COVID-19
specifically; others merely mentioned public health-related risks
more generally.2os But some funds chose not to disclose any public health risks, despite the pandemic's ubiquitous effects.207 Using
both hand-coded labels and topic models, this Article systematically evaluates patterns in disclosure variation.2os This Part concludes by considering the implications of disclosure variation in
participation and specificity.209

B. COVID-19 Risk Disclosures
This Part analyzes an original dataset of 7,998 mutual fund
disclosures scraped from 497K filings to assess how funds disclosed
2oo

Id.

SEC, RELEASE NO. 33821, ORDER UNDER SECTION 6(C), 12(D)(1)(J), 17(B),
17(D) AND 38(A) OF THE INvESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND RULE 17-D1
THEREUNDER GRANTING EXEMPTIONS FROM SPECIFIED PROVISIONS OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND CERTAIN RULES THEREUNDER (2020).
201

2o2 Staff Statemen~· Importance of Delivering Timely and Material Information to Investment Company Investors, SEC, DN. OF INv. MGMT. (Apr. 14, 2020),

https:/lwww.sec.gov/investment/delivering-timely-material-information [https:/1
perma.cc/2AYS-22R8].
2oa Investor Alerts & Bulletins, Look Out for Coronavirus-Related Investment
Scams-Investor Alert, SEC (Feb. 10, 2021), Related Investment ScamsInvestor Alert, https://www.sec.gov/oiealinvestor-alerts-and-bulletins/ia_corona
virus [https://perma.cc/897P-85F7].
204 COVID-19 Response FAQ, SEC, DN. INv. MGMT. (May 12, 2021), https:/1
www.sec.gov/investment/covid-19-response-faq [https://perma.cc/93P9-34XU].
2o5 See infra Figure 1.
206 See infra Figure 2.
201 See infra Figure 2.
2oa See infra Table 12.
209 See infra Figure 2.
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the rapidly occurring COVID-19 pandemic.21o The data document
the onset of COVID-19 disclosures in 2020 and the overall growth
of public health disclosures in 2020. 211 This Article assess the
specificity of these disclosures using hand-coded labels and examine whether funds discussed COVID-19 or made generic disclosures.212 Finally, a structural topic model (STM) further explores
the contents of COVID-19 disclosures.21a

1. Building a Public Health-Specific Dataset of Mutual Fund
Disclosures
The data set is built by scrapping htm files of all registered
investment company 497K summary prospectuses flied between
2010 and 2020 from the SEC (EDGAR). This produced a total of
213,861 filings. Filings without principal risk sections214 and small
files (under 8 KB), 215 were dropped, leaving a total of 164,602
filings.21s Funds may file more than one disclosure each year,
however.217 To correct for this, duplicate filings for the same fund
are dropped, and only the latest filed disclosure is retained in the
data set.21s See Table 8 for additional information on how the data
was compiled.
To start, a wide-ranging list of keywords was built to reliably identify a public health risk (see Table 1 below), including variations on COVID-19.219 The terms capture general public health
See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 2.
212 See infra Table 12.
213 See infra Table 4.
214 See infra Table 8. When a fund files a supplement to the prospectus and
the fund is not updating the principal risk section, the keywords would be omitted from the f:tling and dropped from our sample.
215 See infra Table 8. Files under 8 KB in size suggest a supplement to a
f:tling. Small file sizes are also dropped from the sample, unless the text con·
tains the principal risk keywords.
21s See infra Table 8.
211 See infra Table 8.
21s See infra Table 8.
219 The word list was validated first by using word2vec relationships and
reviewing the most frequent word lists from the corpus. Reading through countless
disclosure texts confirmed the keyword lists. Iteratively applying the word list to
random samples of principal risk disclosure text further validated the final
word list.
21o

211
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phrases and references to past health events (i.e., MERS). The
data track the arrival of COVID·19 disclosures with unique keywords related to the pandemic.22o Examining all public health
disclosures for the nine years before the pandemic, provides a
better sense of how risk disclosures changed, if at all, in response
to COVID-19.221
TABLE 1
PuBUC HEALTH DISCLOSURE KEYWORDS

communicable disease *
contagion
coronaVJIUs
covidlcovid 19
disease
epidemic
global health I global health crisis
global pandemic
health crisis I health crises
health risk
health screenings
hiv
influenzalh1n1
illness
outbreak
pandemic/epidemic
pathogen
prevention
public health
quarantine
respiratory illness
sanitation
sars I sars cov 2 I mers
travel restriction
Vlrus

*All keywords were used in a caseinsensitive search that included singular
and plural variants.
220
221

See infra Table 8.
See infra Figure 2.
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Second, each principal risk disclosure sentence containing
a public health keyword was extracted. 222 This produced 16,204
sentences223 in 7,998 filings224 containing at least one public health·
related term across eleven years of data. 225 The vast majority
(86.6% of all sentences and 73.7% of all filings) occur in 2020. 226
These data are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 1.

See infra Table 2. Note that standard text preprocessing procedures like
removing capitalization and removing most punctuation was used.
223 See infra Table 2. Recall that this study only examines the text of a dis·
closure's principal risks section.
224 See infra Table 2. Each filing has its own unique accession number with
three components that creates a unique identifier for the filing. The first com·
ponent is a lO·digit central index key (CIK) which identifies the fund family.
The next two digits are the year in which it was filed. For example, if the
11th and 12th digits of an accession number were "12," you would know that
the filing was made in 2012. Finally, the last six digits indicate the numerical
order in which the filing was made by the fund. The 330th filing for a particu·
Jar fund would have the last five digits "00330."
225 See infra Table 2.
226 See infra Table 2; see also infra Table 10 and Table 11. Located in the
Appendix, they list the count and proportion of public health sentences and
disclosures by year and fund type.
222
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Table 2 suggests that, not cmly does the volume of public
health .fi1ingB Uu:reaee, but ao does the depth of treatment of public
health issues. In addition to sen'lienDe and filing counts, Table 2
additioDally provides the auerage Aumber of public health ~
tences peT dlscJosure. This statistic helps put in context the IIDIDUDt
of attention given to public health topics.22'1 A bigber number of
public health sentences per disclosure indicate higher levels of
m 8« 81o1JRU Table 2.
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attention and discussion in a disclosure.22s Between 2010 and 2019,
funds that include any discussion of public health devote roughly
one sentence to the issue.229 But in 2020, each fund that mentions
public health writes, on average, 2.38 sentences.230 This suggests
funds are doing more than mentioning a public health risk in pass·
ing. Rather, funds may be discussing this risk with some specificity.

2. Widespread Public Health Disclosure Across Fund Type
and Filing Year
After years of infrequent public health disclosures, in 2020,
the number of public health risk disclosures skyrocketed, jumping
to over 5,800.231 As shown in Table 3, no more than five percent
for any fund type disclosed public health risks between 2010 and
2015. Gradually more funds, particularly money market funds,
included public health risks in the principal risk disclosures
likely because of global health events like MERS and a resulting
lawyerly inclination to disclose all categories of risk. 232
Roughly flfty percent or more of all fund groups included
public health disclosures in 2020.233 Index funds disclosed public
health risks the most frequently at sixty-three percent.234 Index
disclosures are likely driven by investment strategy because Index funds are a highly diversified ''basket of securities ... meant to

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 2.
2ao See supra Table 2.
231 See supra Figure 1.
232 MERS, or the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, was first discovered
in 2012 and joined the list of potential pandemic infections, like SARS in the
early 2000s. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, CDC (Aug. 2, 2019), https:/1
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/about/index.html [https://perma.cdC3F8-NW7U].
Additional heslth threats like the Ebola virus outbreskin West Africain 2014--2016
also raised awareness of potential health threats. See Ebola Virus Disease,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 1, 2021), https://www.who.int/health-topics/ebola
/#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/HZG2-2EP9].
288 See infra Table 3.
284 See infra Table 3. Note that table percentages report the proportion of
funds that disclosed public health risks within the CRSP category. For example,
in 2020, fifty-five percent af all fixed income funds disclosed public health risks.
22s

22•
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represent a sector of a stock market or of an economy."235 Widespread market-impacting events like the COVID-19 pandemic
would also impact Index funds.236
Within the first year of the pandemic, public health disclosures increased dramatically and became widespread among all
fund types. A majority of funds disclosed public health risks during
2020, a time when COVID-19 clearly constituted a changing market
condition requiring disclosure. The data suggests some success
of the SEC's open-ended approach to regulating dynamic risk. 237
But disclosure was far from universal. Funds' failures to
disclose public health risk suggests room for regulatory improvement.238 COVID-19 affected all areas of social and economic life,
yet the number of funds disclosing a public health risk in most
fund categories was between fifty percent and sixty percent.239
Domestic equity funds, which are funds invested in U.S. stocks,
saw a disclosure rate of approximately fifty-two percent.240 Foreign equity funds disclosed at a fifty-four percent rate.241 Both
rates seem low given COVID-19's pervasive social and economic
effects. 242 Index funds were the most likely to disclose a public
health risk, a fact driven by their investment strategy. 243 Funds
designed to capture broad economic trends would certainly be
impacted by COVID. But only sixty-three percent of all Index fund
disclosures included any discussion of public health risks.244 Openended regulations work, but imperfectly.
285 Index Funds, lNvESTOR.GOV (July 31, 2021), https://www.investor.gov
/introduction-investing/investing-basics/investment-products/mutual-funds-and
-exchange-traded -4 [https://perma.cc/FN4L-3QA6].
286 See Lihuan Zhou et al., 3 Things to Know About ESG Fund Behavior
During the Pandemic, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www
.wri.org/insights/3-things-know-about-esg-fund-behavior-during-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/L967-PRMU].
237 See infra Table 3.
288 See infra Table 3.
239 See infra Table 3.
240 See infra Table 3.
241 See infra Table 3.
242 See infra Table 3; CRS COVID-19, supra note 180, at 1.
248 See infra Table 3 (showing that Index funds had the highest rate of disclosures of public health risks at sixty-three percent).
244 See infra Table 3.
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TABLE3

NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURES BY
YEAR AND FuND TYPE

Fund T\·~e

Domestic
Equity
Index

Year

%of all DE

fixed
Income

Di sc losure count

Money
Market

Disc losure count

Missing

20 12

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

0.08%

12
0.69%

0. 15%

14
0. 64%

17
0.72%

21
0.83%

33
1.22%

17
0.61 %

46
1.66%

34
1.24%

52.16%

14
2 .04%

17
2.1 1%

21

0.31 %

2.21%

27
2.52%

25
1.93%

35
2.34%

35
2.06%,

1.57%

2.00%

1235
63.07 %

0. 18%

0.28%

0.36%

0. 21%

0.00%

6
0.51%

0.63%

0.53%

10
0.75%

13
0.99%

53.71%

0.21 %

0.35%

0.48%

0.15%

0 .30%

0. 14%

0.42%

0.41%

0 .41%

0.27%

395
55.56%

0. 55%

12
2.54%

18
3.31%

21
3.35%

33
4.82%

43
5.79%

50
6.3 1%

36
4.52%

38
4.99%

48
6.23%

56.20%

0.58%

16
1.30%

22
1.53%

28
1.68%

52
2.84%

69
3.46%

85
4.04%

76
3.60%

80
3.85%

4.40%

958
49.77 %

39
2.47%

73
4.11 %

85
5.07%

80
5.41%

69
5. 18%

83
7.90%

86
11.98%

133
24.72%

77
12.44%

37
4.81 %

885
73.08 %

50

131

151

167

200

248

300

307

284

265

5895

Di sclosure count

% of Index fund s

Disclosure count

C RSI'data

2011

Di sc losure count

Foreign
Equity

Others

2010

% of FE funds
%ofF I funds

o/o ofMM funds
Di sclosure count

% of Other funds
Disclosure count
% of missing

TOTAL COUNT BY YEAR

30

40

91

1365

658

399

3. Public Health Disclosures: Content Beyond Keywords
Although a majority of funds disclosed COVID-related
risk, 245 not all public health disclosures are equal. This section
analyzes public health disclosures by sorting public health-related
disclosure content into broad categories to gain a more nuanced
view of principles-based (i.e., public health risks) and open-ended
regulations to disclose changing market conditions (i.e., COVID19).246 From reading countless disclosures, three distinct categories of public health disclosures are apparent, with different degrees
of specificity about the risks facing a fund.247 Using a combination
of hand coding and rules-based coding, each public health disclosure was tagged with one of the three resulting labels: (1) COVID19, (2) General Public Health, or (3) Boilerplate: General Laundry
List. 248 This Article fmds that funds split between general and
boilerplate disclosures until 2020, when there is an explosion of
See infra Table 4.
See infra Section II.B.2.
247 See infra Table 12 (listing additional information on labeling methodology).
248 See infra Table 12.
245

246
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COVID-19 disclosures (fifty-three percent).249 Yet many funds continued to use boilerplate (forty-five percent) and general statements
(two percent) of public health risks during the pandemic.250
P\Jbhc h@alth d1sclosun~ with .lCC@SS!On* as umt

3000

C2J BHpokt CCMO-sp«•fic
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~ Botlerplate ~rilll•undryl•st
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FIGURE 2. PUBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURES BY LABEL AND YEAR

Disclosures that directly discussed COVID-19 or the pandemic were labeled as "COVID-19," the most specific category.25l
These tailored, event-specific disclosures are bespoke disclosures
because they are crafted to provide useful information about a
specific and active risk. Like a bespoke suit is tailor-made, these
disclosures are drafted to fit the current crisis of a global pandemic. For example, one disclosure coded as "COVID-19" stated
"An outbreak of an infectious respiratory illness, COVID-19,
249

260
251

See infra Table 2, Table 4.
See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 12. If a disclosure contained any of the following keywords,

it was tagged as a bespoke, COVID-specific disclosure: covid, coronavirus, this
pandemic, the pandemic, this global pandemic, the global pandemic, this outbreak, this virus.
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caused by a novel coronavirus has resulted in travel restrictions,
disruption of healthcare systems, prolonged quarantines, cancellations, supply chain disruptions, lower consumer demand, layoffs,
ratings downgrades, defaults and other significant economic impacts."252 Out of the over 5,895 public health disclosures in 2020,
fifty-three percent included COVID-19 specific language.253
But some disclosures discussed public health only in a
laundry list of hypothetical catastrophic events. 254 These disclosures are labeled as "Boilerplate: General Laundry List'' disclosures.255 For example, one fund's general laundry list disclosure
stated ''Local, regional, or global events such as war, acts of terrorism, the spread of infectious illness or other public health issues,
recessions, or other events could have a significant impact on the
market generally and on specific securities."256 This disclosure,
which was filed in November 2020, warns an investor about a
generalized public health risk but fails to include context suggesting that at least one of those threats-a global pandemic-is
252 iShares, 2020 Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) S-5 (Aug. 17, 2020).
See also Weitz Investment Management, Core Plus Income Fund Summary
Prospectus (Form 497K) (stating "market risk includes political, regulatory,
economic, social and health risks (including the risks presented by the spread
of infectious diseases such as the COVID-19 pandemic) which can lead to increased market volatility and negative impacts on local and global financial
markets, and the duration and severity of the impact of these risks on markets cannot be reasonably estimated").
258 See infra Table 4.
254 See infra Table 12.
255 Id. Additional rules for this label include: (1) no COVID-specific language,
and (2) must include a public health keyword and a general laundry list keyword. The general laundry list keywords included: political upheaval, social
unrest, war, terrorism, terror attack, financial trouble, financial market, natural
disaster, environmental disaster, country instability, political event, civil unrest,

national election, exchange controls, social event, economic event, economic
development, labor strike, inflation, geopolitical, economic, political, panic,
environmental, social, regional, recession, regulatory development, interest
rate, currency rate, military confrontation, corporate earnings, corporate revenue,
security concern, international relation, cybersecurity, technological, weather,
pollution, cyber, hack, hacking, and attack. General laundry list keywords were
searched in the singular and plural. See infra Table 12.
266 AdvisorShares, AdvisorShares Dorsey Wright FSM US Core ETF Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Nov. 1, 2020).
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currently underway.257 These provisions read as a catchall to
shield a fund from the greatest range of liability for future risks.258
In other words, these are examples of boilerplate disclosures.
Between these two opposite ends of the disclosure spectrum,
funds made general statements about public-health-related investment risk.259 For example, one fund disclosed that "[t]he
securities markets may also decline because of factors that affect
a particular industry or due to impacts from the spread of infectious illness, public health threats or similar issues."260 Others in
this category disclosed the risk of hypothetical pandemics but opted
not to name the current one underway. 261 For example, one fund
disclosed that "[p]reventative or protective actions that governments may take in respect of pandemic or epidemic diseases may
result in periods of business disruption, business closures, inability to obtain raw materials, supplies and component parts, and
reduced or disrupted operations for the issuers in which the Fund
invests."262 Table 4 displays the count of filings containing at
least one of these labels, as well as the percentage of all filings
containing a public health label and proportion of public health
labels by year. Between 2010 and 2019, almost all public health
disclosures can be categorized as ''boilerplate."263 The intermediate category, general public health disclosures, comprises two
percent or less of all public health risk disclosures in each year
throughout this period.264
The onset of COVID-19, however, generates major changes
in funds' disclosure of public health risk. 265 First, the number of
funds making any public health-related disclosure increases almost
eighteen-fold.266 Whereas only 259 funds disclosed a public health
See id.
See id.
259 See infra Table 12.
260 Thrivent Mutual Funds, Tbrivent International Allocation Fund Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Aug. 4, 2020).
261 See Prudential Investment Portfolios 5, Prudential Day One 2035 Fund
Summary Prospectus (Form 497K) (Sept. 29, 2020).
262 Id. (emphasis added).
263 See infra Table 4.
264 See infra Table 4.
265 See infra Table 4.
266 See infra Table 4.
257
258
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risk in 2019, 2,680 did so in 2020.267 By this metric, the SEC's openended requirement to disclose dynamic risk caused by changing
market conditions looks relatively successful. Funds that may
not have previously mentioned public health investment risk are
now disclosing a particularized and previously unforeseeable risk. 268
But forty-five percent of funds still relied on boilerplate
disclosures during the pandemic in 2020. 269 Why would boilerplate be preferable? Both boilerplate laundry list disclosures and
general public health disclosures can be thought of as satisfying
a principles-based requirement to disclose material investment
risk-though to different degrees.270 With both, however, the fund
indicates that the risk is present, but does little more than alert
an investor to its existence.271
These findings also highlight how funds may be constrained
by other, more rigid (i.e., rules-based) regulations when disclosing
risk.272 Recall that a fund's summary prospectus is constrained by
an SEC-recommended page limit and the requirement to summarize principal risks.27a To the extent funds follow such guidelines,274
these constraints force funds to choose between a general shield
and a more nuanced discussion of risk. If funds opt for a more
nuanced discussion, they may have to forego in depth discussions
of other types of risk. 275
More broadly though, one can interpret the data in light
of the SEC regulatory framework. The SEC's open-ended framework facilitated a swift change in 2020: Boilerplate decreased from
See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 4.
269 See infra Table 4. Compare the 2020 data with the 2019 data where
ninety-eight percent of all public health disclosures were boilerplate. I d.
210 See supra Section I.C; infra Table 12.
271 See infra notes 373-83 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
specificity in certain boilerplate and general public health disclosures).
272 See infra Table 4; Tucker & Xia, supra note 119, at 13-14 (discussing
difficulty of complying with the SEC page limit).
273 See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; supra Section I. C.
274 Despite the SEC guidance on recommended page limits, see supra notes
13-17 and accompanying text, the average length of principal risks sections
monotonically and dramatically increased over time. Tucker & Xia, supra note
119, at 13-15.
275 See Tucker & Xia, supra note 119, at 13-15 (discussing the trend of
funds already exceeding the current page limits set by the SEC).
267

26B
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ninety-eight percent in 2019 to forty-five percent in 2020.276 Switching from satisfying principles-based disclosures with tepid accounts
of public health risks to providing bespoke disclosures reflects this
hydraulic relationship where new risks can quickly be incorporated into the disclosure landscape.277
When funds make bespoke public health disclosures, what
do they disclose? The next section introduces a topic model to
explore the content of disclosures and to evaluate whether openended regulations produced more informative disclosures of risk
related to COVID-19.278
TABLE4

COUNT AND PERCENTAGE OF PuBUC HEALTH LABELS BY YEAB

~
I

Bespoke: COVIDspecific

General

Health

Public

Boilerplate:
General laundry
list

2010

2011

201.2

2013

2014

2016

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3103

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

53%

1

0

0

0

4

0

4

6

4

6

112

2%

0%

0%

0%

2%

0%

1%

2%

1%

2%

2%

49

131

151

167

196

248

296

301

280

259

2680

98%

100%

100%

100%

98%

100%

99%

98%

99%

98%

45%

4. Topic Variation and Distribution
Content, not just frequency, of public health risk disclosures inform the success of open-ended requirements to disclose
changing market conditions. Using a structural topic model estimated on 3,103 COVID-specific disclosures examines variation
in the ways that funds specifically disclose public health risks. 279
See infra Table 4.
See infra Section II.B.4.b.
27B See infra Section II.B.4.
279 See supra Table 4.
276
277
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Results show that funds generally addressed four different topics:
onset and scope of the pandemic, market disruption, government
responses, and catastrophic events.2so
Some funds are more likely to talk about certain aspects
of the COVID-19 risk than others. 281 Index funds, for example,
are much more likely to talk about the market disruption caused
by the pandemic than other types offunds. 282 Money market and
fixed income funds are more likely to discuss government responses to the pandemic, whereas funds categorized as "other'' are
significantly more likely to discuss COVID-19 as a catastrophic
event like a natural disaster.2B3
The data and the structural topic model (STM) are described below.2B4 Findings from the model are discussed in more
depth, examining variation in specific public health disclosures
across all fund types and then examining the divergent disclosure approaches taken by different funds.2B5

a. Estimating COVID-Specific Topics
The analysis begins with the 3,103 COVID-specific disclosures discussed in the previous section.2B6 These statements are
analyzed at the disclosure level, meaning that each disclosure is
represented once in the data.2B7
A topic model approach helps analyze the data at hand. 288
Topic models are "probabilistic models for uncovering the underlying semantic structure of a document collection based on hierarchical Bayesian analysis of the original text."289 This automated
approach identifies latent patterns in the text that may be invisible to a human observer.
See infra Table 5.
See infra Figure 4.
282 See infra Figure 4.
288 See infra Figure 4.
284 See infra Section II.B.4.a.
285 See infra Section II.B.4.b.
288 See supra Section II.B.4.
287 See supra Table 4.
288 See supra Table 5.
289 David M. Blei & John D. Lafferty, Topic Models, in TEXT MINJNG: CLASSI-

2ao
281

FICATION, CLUSTERING AND APPIJCATIONS 71 (Chapman and Hall/CRC 2009).
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In particular, a structural topic model uses metadata (i.e.,
characteristics of the data external to the text) to sort texts into
topics.290 The CRSP class (i.e., fund type) is a prevalence covariate,
meaning simply that they structure the model estimation.291 In
other words, fund type may be related to topic prevalence--that
is, "how much of a document is associated with a topic."292
Jointly maximizing measures of semantic coherence293 and
exclusivity (FREX) 294 help to determine the optimal number of
topics. 295 Based on these figures, funds' COVID-specific disclosures could be categorized into four different topics: (1) onset and
scope of the pandemic, (2) market disruption, (3) government responses, and (4) framing the pandemic as a catastrophic event.296
Each topic is characterized by a unique set of ''high probability" words-that is, words that are most likely to appear in a
topic-which aids in interpreting topic content.297 Words with
high FREX are also an indicator of topic content. These words
are included in Table 5.298
Margaret E. Roberts et al., STM: An R Package for Structural Topic
Models, 91 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 2 (2019).
291 See id. at 3.
292 Id. at 2.
293 Roberts defines semantic coherence as a method "closely related to pointwise mutual information'' which is "maximized when the most probable words in
a given topic frequently co·occur together." ld. at 11. In other words, if every
instance of the word "duck'' in a document was accompanied by the word "yellow," then the topic containing the phrase ''yellow duck" would have a high
semantic coherence score.
294 In particular, the STM package uses the FREX metric, which is ''the
weighted harmonic mean of the word's rank in terms of exclusivity [i.e., how
unique a word is to a topic] and frequency [i.e., how often a word appears in a
topic]." Id.
295 See infra Table 5.
296 See infra Table 5.
297 See infra Table 5; Roberts et al., supra note 290, at 2.
298 Note that the words in Table 5 are word stems, a process that reduces
variations of the same word into a common stem. For example, treating the
words ''happy," ''happier," and ''happily" as a single stem reduces the computation burden and can, but does not always, increase interpretability. See
Alexandra Schofield & David Mimno, Comparing Apples to Apple: The Effects
of Stemmers on Topic Models, 4 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS, 287, 287
(2016). As with any tool that reduces complexity, there is a trade off with some
nuanced and important meaning being lost. For a full discussion of stemming
in topic models, see id at 287--89, 291-93.
290
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TABLE5
TOP 15 HIGH PROBABILITY AND FREX WORDS, BY TOPIC299

High

Probabil-

ity

Topic 1:
Onset and
Scope

Topic 2:
Market
Disruption

market,
covid,
result,
pandem,
disrupt,
global,

disrupt, outbreak,
impact, infecti,
coronavirus,
econom, default,
signilic, rate,
result, system,

virus,

caus, healthcar

coronanovel,

FREX

economi,
caus, includ,
world,
volatil,
outbreak,
signific
individu,
major,
avail, decemb, first,
detect,
facil, access, ex-

port, societ,

crisisha,
oftariff,

unforeseen,

throughout, substanti

consum, demand,

Topic 3:
Government
Reactions
market,
impact,

includ,
mam,
covid, may,
pandem,
global,
fund, fi.
nanCI,

negat,
econom,

Topic 4:
Catastrophic
Event
market, coro-

navuus, natur, novel,

volatil, covid,
pandem, widespread, increas, diseas,
sever, can,

disrupt, general, high

restrict,

respons,
secur

lower, downgrad,
layoff, cancella·
tionssuppli, system, demand,
consum, default,
healthcar, instabl,
rate, infecti, geopolit, ebola

chang,
polit, issu ·

high, envi-

er, aggress,

ronment, fire,
hurrican,

terror,

flood, tsunami,

industri,

taken, issu,
domest,
social,

varieti,
addit,
particular,
municip,
fall

earthquak,

phenomena,
weatherrel,
lead, disasterepidem, constraint, cost,

instanc, illnessinclud

299 Note that each word has been "stemmed," meaning that it has been reduced to an approximation of its stem to better capture variations in form.
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b. Distribution of Specific COVID-19 Disclosures
COVID-specific disclosures exhibit statistically significant
variation in topics across the entire sample and fund type.300 Note
that each disclosure may contain a mixture of topics.30l The tokens (i.e., unique words or phrases) in each disclosure estimates
the proportion of the disclosure devoted to a particular topic. 302
Recall that the "Catastrophic Event'' topic is characterized by the
high probability token "natur'' and the high FREX token "earthquak."303 The following COVID-specific disclosure would be highly
likely to be associated with this topic:
natural or environmental disasters such as earthquakes fires
floods hurricanes tsunamis and other severe weather-related
phenomena generally and widespread disease and illnessincluding pandemics and epidemics such as the novel coronavirus have been and can be highly disruptive to economies
and markets. 804

Funds disclosing a COVID-specific risk are most likely to
disclose information about the onset of the pandemic. 305 On average, roughly 33.9% of all COVID-specific disclosures discussed
this subject. 306 Government response to the pandemic is the next
most common topic (28.4% of all public health disclosures). 307
Finally, disclosures were equally likely to discuss the pandemic
in the same breath as a catastrophic event (19.6%) or as a force
of market disruption (18.1%).308

soo See infra Figure 4.
301 See supra Table 5.
302 See Roberts et a!., supra note 290, at 9. Formally, e (theta) is defined as
the estimate of the proportion of a document devoted to a particular topic.
303 See supra Table 5.
304 Lincoln Variable Ins. Prod. Tr., Summary Prospectus (Form 497K)
(May 1, 2020).
305 See infra Figure 4.
306 See infra Figure 4.
307 See infra Figure 4. The difference between the mean theta for onset and
government response is statistically sigoificant at p < 0. 001.
308 See infra Figure 4. The mean market disruption theta was statistically
indistinguishable from the mean catastrophic event theta.

REGULATING DYNAMIC RISK

2022]

819

0.3

0.0
Onset

FIGURE

Market Dlan.tptlon

Gov. Response

Topics

Cateatrophlc Events

3. DISTRIBUTION OF TOPIC ACROSS ALL DISCLOSURES

The success of open-ended regulations, such as requirements to disclose changing market conditions, depends on funds
complying not just with the letter of the regulation, but also with
the spirit.309 Investors are best informed when funds provide an
informative statement about the changing market condition at
issue, as well as the specific investment risk it poses. 310
This Article argues that an optimally functioning openended regulation should produce disclosures that are both universal and relatively uniform within fund type. One may expect
some variation between fund type, however, due to differences in
risk exposure.3n
First, risk disclosure was not universal: just over half (5,895)
of all fund disclosures in 2020 mentioned any public health risks,

310

Principles-Based Securities Regulation, supra note 83, at 277.
See SEC, DIV. INV. MGMT., DISCLOSURE REV. & ACCT. OFF., ADI 2019-08--

311

See id.

309

IMPROVING PRINCIPAL RISKS DISCLOSURE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov
/investment/accounting-and -disclosure-information/principal-risks/adi-2019-08
-improving-principal-risks-disclosure [https://perma.cc/DL9T-F7MU] .
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and fifty-two percent (3,103) of those disclosures made bespoke
COVID-19 disclosures.a12
However, a fair amount of statistically significant variation occurs across fund type.313 The difference between index funds
and all other fund types is the most striking. COVID-specific
disclosures made by index funds were significantly more likely
to discuss market disruption than any other fund type. 314 Index
funds devoted over forty-nine percent of public health disclosure
text to discussing COVID-19's market disruption compared to other
fund types that addressed this topic between five percent and
fifteen percent of their public health disclosures.315 This tendency makes sense given that index funds represent a broad segment of public markets, so they are exposed to market-level
risks more than other fund categories. ala
Similarly, Money Market (M) and Fixed Income (FI) funds
were significantly more likely to discuss government response
(47.0% and 46.2%, respectively) than all other fund types. 317 Attention to this risk likely reflects the fact that both fund types
are affected by interest rates, governmental monetary policy, and
the fiscal stability of governments. alB
Patterns of disclosure among Domestic Equity (DE) and
Foreign Equity (FE) funds provide some additional evidence that
indicates success in open-ended regulation. DE and FE funds discuss onset, market disruption, government response, and the pandemic as a catastrophic event at nearly identical rates.319 This is
exactly what one would hope. Both types of funds are invested in
See supra Table 4.
See infra Figure 4.
314 See infra Figure 4. All difference-in-means tests were statistically sig·
nificant at p < 0.001.
315 See infra Figure 4.
816 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
317 See infra Figure 4. These differences-in·means were all statistically sig·
nificant at p < 0.001.
818 See, e.g., Bonds, INvESTOR.GOV, https:llwww.investor.gov/introduction-in
vesting/investing-basics/investment-products/bonds·or-fixed·income-products
/bonds [https:l/perma.C<'i5GTF-QS9G] (describing fixed income products and risk
exposure); Money Market Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/in
troduction·investinglinvesting·basics/investment·products/mutual·funds·and·ex
change·traded-5 [https://perma.C<'i2JM6·EZ'YMI (describing money market fund
and key risk exposure).
819 See infra Figure 4.
312

313
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equities-DE in American firms and FE in foreign fums.320 COVID19 affected both types offunds.321 In other words, the pandemic's
global reach 322 suggests that similarly situated funds should report similar risks-which is precisely what the data show.323

0.5
.~

a.

CRSP Class

s

DE
FE

~ 0.4

~ 0.3

Fl

~

-2 0.2

lndax
M

~

Miaaing

~ 0. 1

Others

~

0.0

Topics

FIGURE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS ACROSS FUND TYPE

These findings indicate that the SEC's open-ended regulation of changing market conditions was largely successful but could
be improved. Many funds' failure to disclose any public health
investment risk puts both funds and investors in a difficult position.324 Differences in disclosure language within fund types may
See supra note 240-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 240-41 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
323 See supra Section II.B.4.b. The difference between the average DE and
FE thetas for all topics failed to reach statistical significance.
324 See, e.g., Tobi Carter Richards, SEC Financial Reporting Under the Microscope: Coronavirus Risk Disclosures, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2020),
h ttps ://tax.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/reports/sec-financial-reporting-un
der-the-microscope-coronavirus-risk-disclosures [https://perma.cc/X9ZZ-3DAU].
320

321
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mislead investors into believing that some firms face little to no
risk based on their portfolio and others face substantial risk. 325
Yet, the pervasive nature of COVID·19 suggests this is not the
case. 326 Funds that disclose a public health risk may be placed at
a disadvantage with investors, particularly those funds that disclose risks in detail. 327 Part N returns to the threat of punishing
fulsome disclosures and discusses possible interventions.32B
However, among those funds that disclosed COVID-19 risks,
differences between funds suggest these funds take seriously the
SEC's mandate to disclose specific risks.329
The next Part continues to explore fund compliance with
SEC open-ended regulations to disclose changing market conditions by examining a slowly unfolding event: the Puerto Rican
debt crisis. 330

III. CHANGED MARKET CONDITIONS: PuERTO RICO DISCLOSURES
Puerto Rico became insolvent in June 2014.331 To restructure
its debt, the Puerto Rican government passed the Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act. 332 The Act signaled
that the island was on the brink of a destabilizing fmancial crisis.333 Fixed income funds investing in the island faced new and
serious risks. 334 If Puerto Rico couldn't pay its debt, the funds would
not get paid the principal due. 335 Puerto Rican assets would be
considered "junk bonds" that would be hard to sell except at a
See Tucker & Xia, supra note 119, at 1-2.
See supra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
327 See supra Table 4.
328 See infra notes 529--35 and accompanying text.
829 See supra Figure 4.
330 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19.
881 Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 553, 568--78 (2014). Municipalities become insolvent when they
have more debt than assets. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc.,
863 A.2d 772, 782 (Del. Ch. 2004) (defining insolvency as "a deficiency of as·
sets below liabilities" or "an inability to meet maturing obligations as they
fall due in the ordinary course of business').
332 2014 P.R. Laws 71.
333 See Christopher K. Odinet, Of Progressive Property and Public Debt, 51
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2016).
334 Id. at 1129--30.
885 Id. at 1139.
325
326
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very steep loss.336 This development seriously jeopardized portfolio returns. 337
Puerto Rico first defaulted on its debt service payments on
municipal bonds in August 2015.338 After several more defaults,339
the U.S. government intervened in 2016 340 with a bill extending
federal bankruptcy-like debt restructuring protections to Puerto
Rico. 341 This provided funds invested in Puerto Rico debt with
more protection, but these investments were still subject to serious and evolving risks including legal uncertainty and continued
financial strain. 342
In 2016, the SEC issued guidance on changing market conditions.343 The agency instructed affected funds to update their
disclosures. 344 This guidance required funds to name Puerto Rico
as an investment location and identify the heightened risks of
the investment such as downgrades in debt ratings (junk bonds),
negative market values, and illiquidity of fund securities. 345
SEC staff enforced this new guidance when reviewing funds'
principal investment strategies and risk disclosures in Form N-lA.346
886 See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Puerto Rico Bonds Downgraded to Junk
Levels, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.washlngtonpost.com/business
/economy/puerto-rico-bonds-downgraded-to-junk-levels/2014/02104/c9495a22-8ddf
-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story .html [https://perma.cc/TM3R-3YSD].
887 See, e.g., Arney Stone, Dont Shrug Off Puerto Rico Risks, BARRON'S
(May 6, 2017), https:l/www.barrons.com/articles/dont-shrug-off-puerto-rico-risks
-1494045533 [https://perma.cc/QLB2-2WU2].
888 In August 2015, Puerto Rico defaulted on debt service payments on
bonds issued by the Public Finance Corporation. D. Andrew Austin, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44532: The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328), 32 (July 1, 2016) [hereinafter
CRS Puerto Rico], https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44532.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J3ZH-GM7S].
889 On May 1, 2016, Governor Garcia Padilla ordered the government's fiscal agent not to make payments on 423 million dollars in debt. Id.
840 See The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability
Act (PROMESA), Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016).
841 CRS Puerto Rico, supra note 338, at 32. President Barack Obama signed
the bill into law the day before the island made a two billion dollar default.
Odinet, supra note 333, at 1117.
842 Odinet, supra note 333, at 1142.
843 Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 1.
844Jd.
845 Id. at 5.
846 Id. at 6.
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For example, the SEC rejected a disclosure by Nuveen California
Municipal Value Fund, Inc. stating that "the municipal securities in which the Fund invests may be issued by United States
territories such as Puerto Rico." 347 The SEC directed Nuveen to
disclose if it has "significant exposure to Puerto Rico debt" and if
so, the principal risks associated with investments in the commonwealth.348 With the guidance, the SEC moved from principlesbased and open-ended regulation into a more formalistic, rules-based
approach.349 Once the crisis materialized and posed prolonged
threats, funds had to disclose the new risks.350 This new guidance
made clear that investments in Puerto Rican debt should be disclosed differently than other forms of territorial or municipal debt,
such as debt issued by the Virgin Islands or Guam. 351
Unlike the COVID-19 public health crisis, the Puerto Rican debt
crisis slowly unfolded over several years. 352 The gap between
the first serious sign in 2014 that the Puerto Rican economy
was collapsing and the SEC's guidance in 2016 that funds
should be disclosing municipal bond investments creates an
opportunity to evaluate funds' voluntary inclusion of changing
marketing conditions and the impact of SEC guidance on the
specificity of funds' disclosure of this risk. 353

A. Puerto Rican Disclosure Data
Using the same dataset of mutual fund disclosures from
2010 to 2020, as previously described, this Article studied funds'
response to the unfolding Puerto Rican debt crisis. 354 Keywords,
found by searching for ''Puerto Rico" and "Puerto Rican," narrowed the data set to relevant disclosures. Keywords identified 1332
Puerto Rico disclosures (see Table 8 in the Appendix).355 Instead
347 Nuveen Cal. Mun. Value Fund Inc., SEC Staff Comment N-2 (Sept. 29,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000818851/00011931251678
4036/f'llenamel.htm [https://perma.cc/YL3W-9S7X].

848/d.

See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 5.
See id. at 1, 6.
351 Id. at 5.
352 Id. at 5.
858 See supra Part III.
354 See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text.
855 See infra note 559 and accompanying text.
349
350
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of extracting a single sentence for each keyword, a five-sentence
window was used.356 All extracted text from a single fund's disclosure was combined into one entry, and this disclosure-level
data is reported, but not sentence-level data.357
Here, the data show additional evidence of funds disclosing emerging risks consistent with open-ended regulations. 358
Funds dramatically increased the number of Puerto Rico risk
statements in 2013.359 These statements peak in 2016.360 The
numbers decline but remain elevated through 2020 as compared
with pre-2013 data.361 Table 6 shows the disclosure counts by
year, first for all funds and then for fixed income funds only. The
remainder of this discussion focuses on fixed income funds, like
bond funds,362 which are the most heavily invested in Puerto
Rican assets and comprise the bulk of all Puerto Rico-specific
risk disclosures. 363
TABLE6
PUERTO RICO DISCLOSURES BY YEAR AND FUND TYPE

Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Puerto Rico Disclosures
All Funds
Fixed Income Funds
26
0.48%
22
(4.65%)
29
0.40%
25
(4.36%)
31
0.39%
29
(4.68%)
122
1.43%
110
(16.87%)
166
1.84%
150
(22.83%)
163
1.72%
154
(22.25%)

See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text. Sentence level data is
not reported.
358 See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text.
360 See infra Table 8.
361 See infra Table 8.
362 See, e.g., Bonds, supra note 318.
363 See Emily Leblanc, What Happens When an Island Starts to Drown
Under Its Own Weight? The Debt Crisis of Puerto Rico, 20 OR. R. INT'L. L. 306,
310-11 (2019). Fixed income funds disclosed around ninety percent of all Puerto
Rican risk and were the most exposed asset class to the crisis. See infra Table
6. The SEC also specifically identified fixed Income funds in the 2016 guidance. Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2-4.
356

357
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Year
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

Puerto Rico Disclosures
All Funds
Fixed Income Funds
162
1.65%
152
(21.29%)
153
1.53%
139
(19.02%)
151
1.48%
133
(18.32%)
167
1.61%
142
(19.48%)
(19.27%)
162
1.56%
137
1332

1.36%

1193

(16.39%)

B. Puerto Rican Disclosure Labels
Funds' disclosures of Puerto Rico-specific risk increased
over this period, but this reveals little about the success of the
open-ended requirement to disclose the Puerto Rican debt crisis
as a changing market condition.364 Examining the quality and
specificity of those disclosures helps assess the success of openended disclosure requirements. 365 Territorial investment risk disclosures, like public health disclosures, can be categorized into
one of three categories: (1) a bespoke disclosure that provides a
warning to investors of the risk that Puerto Rico will default on
its debt (or has already); (2) a general statement that investing
in Puerto Rico entails some risk; and (3) a boilerplate statement
that investing in U.S. territories like Puerto Rico carries a risk.366
Bespoke disclosures identified the specific risks unique to
Puerto Rico: first the looming credit crisis and later Puerto Rico's
defaults. 367 For example, warning language appearing before the
first defaults included "[i]nvesting a significant portion of its assets in the municipal securities of U.S. territories and possessions also makes the fund more sensitive to risks specific to such
See id. at 1-2.
See id.
366 The Appendix contains additional information on Puerto Rico Labeling
procedures. See infra Table 13.
867 See infra Table 13. Disclosures are labeled as either warning/watch or
as a default statement to track more granular disclosure information. Both
labels are reported as Bespoke: Puerto Rico Specific Disclosures here. I d.; see
James Chen, Bespoke CDO, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.investo
pedia.com/termslblbespoke-cdo.asp [https://perma.cc/8CGG-WK54]; What is
Bespoke? Definitions and Examples, MARKET BUSINESS NEWS (2021), https:/1
marketbusinessnews.com/fi.nancial-glossarylbespoke-definitionl [https://perma.cc
/Z2MP-SFS7].
364

866
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U.S. territories and possessions. Certain municipal bond issuers
in Puerto Rico have recently been experiencing financial difficulties and rating agency downgrades." 368 Mter Puerto Rico defaulted, one fund disclosed the following:
Some Puerto Rico issuers are in default on principal and interest
payments. If there are additional defaults and the general
economic situation in Puerto Rico persist or worsen, the vola·
tility and credit quality of Puerto Rican municipal securities
could be adversely affected, and the market for such securities
may experience continued volatility .... Municipal securities issued
by Puerto Rico issuers have extremely low credit ratings and
are on "negative watch'' by credit rating organizations. In addition, Puerto Rico's difficulties have resulted in increased vola·
tility in portions of the broader municipal securities market
from time to time, and this may recur in the future. This default
casts doubts on the ability of Puerto Rico and its government
agencies to make future payments. The government development bank, which provides liquidity to Puerto Rico's government
agencies, defaulted on a $400 million debt payment. 369

Figure 5 shows that funds first offered bespoke Puerto Rico
disclosures in 2013. Raw counts peaked in 2016 and 2017 with
seventy-nine bespoke disclosures each year. 370 The proportion of
bespoke disclosures peaked in 2018, when bespoke disclosures
comprised fifty-two percent of all Puerto Rico disclosures. an As
the crisis lessened, fewer funds issued bespoke disclosures about
Puerto Rico.372
General boilerplate disclosures, on the other hand, merely
mentioned Puerto Rico as a territory in which the fund invests, or
in which it may invest.373 An example of generic boilerplate disclosure follows: "the fund may be more sensitive to these events
and conditions if it invests a substantial portion of its assets in the
municipal securities ... in the securities of issuers located within
a single state, municipality, territory (such as Puerto Rico), or
868 Integrity Managed Portfolios, Kansas Municipal Fund (Form 497K) (Dec. 7,
2010); Integrity Managed Portfolios, Kansas Municipal Fund 4 (2010).
869 Kansas Municipal Fund, Summary Prospectus 2 (2014).
37o Id.
37t Id.
872 See id.
373 See infra Table 13; James Chen, Boilerplate, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 2, 2021),
https:/lwww.investopedia.com/termslblboilerplate.asp [https://perma.oc17AD4-QSZT].
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geographic area."374 Boilerplate disclosures state hypothetical risks
without a clear signal to investors that they in fact are exposed to
specific risks from the investment in Puerto Rican securities. 375
Despite their lack of specificity, boilerplate disclosures were
the most common Puerto Rican disclosure in the beginning and
end of the sample period, holding steady between fifty-five percent
and sixty percent. 376 During the debt crisis however, bespoke disclosures displaced boilerplate disclosures: boilerplate disclosures
dropped to around thirty percent from 2014 to 2016.377 Boilerplate disclosures grew in 2017, when they increased to forty-four
percent and rose to precrisis levels in 2018 and beyond.378 As the
crisis faded in severity and novelty, boilerplate statements again
dominated Puerto Rican disclosures.379
The third label-general PR territory risks-sits in between
bespoke and boilerplate disclosures.3BD General PR territory disclosures described risks associated with Puerto Rico without
identifying specific facts about the current situation. 381 Other disclosures in this category hedged stated risks with contingent language.382 These funds signaled specific problems in Puerto Rico,
but they did not state if investors were exposed to these risks. 383
Lord Abbett Bond Debenture Fund, Summary Prospectus (2018).
See id.
376 See infra Table 14.
377 See infra Table 14.
878 See infra Table 14.
379 See infra Table 14.
880 See infra Table 13.
381 For example, one fund disclosed the following:
In recent years, Puerto Rico has experienced a recession and
dll'ficult economic conditions. Adverse economic, market, political, or other conditions within Puerto Rico may negatively affect
the value of the fund's holdings in Puerto Rican municipal obligations. The fund may invest in municipal obligations issued
by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its agencies, or other
U.S. territories, which generally are tax-exempt.
John Hancock Tax-Free Bond Fund, Summary Prospectus (2013).
882 See, e.g., Lord Abbett Multi-Asset Global Opportunity Fund, Summary
Prospectus 10 (2019).
383 Virginia Tax-Free Fund for Montana, Summary Prospectus (2019).
In recent years, certain municipal bond issuers in Puerto Rico
have been experiencing financial dll'ficulties and rating agency
downgrades. To the extent it invests a significant portion of
374
875
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General PR territory risk disclosures increased between
2010 and 2014.384 In 2014, funds most frequently disclosed the
risk associated with Puerto Rican debt using this type of language,
comprising forty-three percent of all Puerto Rican disclosures.385
General disclosures became less common in the depths of the debt
crisis through 2015.386 Following the SEC's guidance about properly disclosing Puerto Rico risks, general language became less
common than both bespoke and boilerplate disclosures. 387 Few
funds choose to make general territory risk disclosures following
the debt crisis in 2018 and later.388
100

Baspoke (PR Warning/Default)
Boilerplate (General US. Tetritory)
G!ineral (PR Territory)

75

8=

50

25

0

FIGURE 5. PUERTO RICO DISCLOSURES BY LABEL AND YEAR

Figure 6 shows the trade-off between precrisis disclosures, where general and boilerplate disclosures dominated, and

I d.

its assets in the municipal securities of U.S. territories and
possessions, the fund will also be more sensitive to risks specific to such U.S. territories and possessions.

See supra Figure 5.
See infra Table 14.
386 See infra Table 14.
387 See infra Table 14.
388 See infra Table 14.
384
385
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postcrisis disclosures, where bespoke disclosures dominated and
replaced general disclosures. General Puerto Rican risk disclosure comprised thirty-seven percent of all labels in 2013 but only
four percent in 2017. 389 Bespoke disclosures increased from seven
percent to fifty-two percent over this same period.39o
The data provide some evidence that the SEC's open-ended
regulations performed their function-after all, disclosures did
increase over this period, and at the height of the crisis, these
disclosures became more specific about the risks associated with
investing in Puerto Rico.391
But funds' continued reliance on boilerplate disclosures about
generic risk associated with investing in U.S. territories creates
some concern. Is a regulation successful if roughly half of the disclosures that mentioned Puerto Rico failed to provide any specific
information about the island's ongoing debt crisis?392
Moreover, the methodology likely under-sampled disclosures by funds exposed to Puerto Rican investment risk. 393 By
selecting the sample on the variants of the phrase "Puerto Rico,"
the data are likely missing some of the worst offenders: funds
invested in Puerto Rican bonds but fail to disclose any exposure
even in passing.a94

See infra Figure 6.
See infra Figure 6.
391 See infra Figure 5, Figure 6, Table 14.
892 See infra Figure 6.
393 Tom Anderson, Is Your Bond Invested in Puerto Rico?, CNBC (June 30,
2015, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/30/is-your·bond·fund-invested
-in-puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/JV2N·ZXW2].
394 Lorie Konish, If You Don't Think You Own Puerto Rico Debt, You're
Most Likely Wrong, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017
/1 0/04/if-you ·dont-think·you -own-puerto-rico-debt·youre-most-likely-wrong
.html [https://perma.cc/3JZU-6NUN].
889
390
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2013

Bespoke PR warning/ default, 7%

2017
Bespoke PR warning/ default, 52%

General PR territory. 4%

Boilerplate: General US territory, 44%

FIGURE 6. PUERTO RICO DISCLOSURE LABELS BY PROPORTION
PRE- AND POST-DEBT CAPTION

C. Portfolio Composition and Disclosure Specificity
As noted above, many funds disclosed the Puerto Rican
debt crisis risks with specificity, but others did not. 395 But it is
possible that some of this variation is due to differences in the
extent of funds' exposure to Puerto Rican debt. In other words,
gradations in disclosure language may match differences in the
actual portfolio holdings.
Using portfolio holding data from 2015 and 2016, there is
evidence that portfolio differences appear to be related to disclosure specificity.396 Funds that made boilerplate disclosures held
See infra Figure 6.
See infra Table 7. Fund CIK series number is obtained from Form 497K
disclosures. See infra Appendix A, Section D. The CIK number is used to match
395
396

the disclosure data to fund portfolio data including security name, number of
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fewer Puerto Rican assets (4.2 securities on average) compared
to funds that made bespoke disclosures (15.3 securities on average). In addition, funds making bespoke disclosures invested a
larger percentage of the fund's assets in Puerto Rico: six percent
for bespoke disclosures compared to one percent for boilerplate. 397
Table 7 reports the results.
Matching portfolio risk to disclosure specificity is encouraging for those who believe that disclosure is the best disinfectant. The results suggest open-ended regulations mostly work.398
This Article cautions the enthusiastic reader: the matching is
imperfect.399 Some funds with Puerto Rican investments did not
disclose at all or relied on mere boilerplate. 400 For example, two
funds that made boilerplate disclosures, did so in 2016 after clear
defaults by Puerto Rico and after guidance by the SEC urging
clear risk disclosures. 401 At the time of the boilerplate disclosure,
those funds also held forty or more different Puerto Rican assets
and invested over five percent of the fund's assets in the island's
debt. 402 Yet, the funds provided investors with no clear indication of the specific risks the funds faced.
shares, and percentage invested from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) that is offered by Wharton Research Database Service. See
infra Appenclix A, Section A The methodology matches the Puerto Rico disclosure sample based on the fund number in the Form 497K and the CRSP
data with the common key CIK series number, between the two data sets. See
infra Table 8. Thereafter, portfolio holdings of the over three hundred funds
in the sample are reviewed. See infra Appendix A, Section A. Using the keywords ''Puerto Rico," ''Puerto Rican," and "F D PR" identifies Puerto Rican
securities. See id. The number of Puerto Rican securities are counted and
report as the sum of the investment exposure of each Puerto Rican security
held by the fund. See infra Table 15. Using the number of securities and the
investment percentage, one can compare the investment exposure of the funds to
Puerto Rican securities. See infra Table 16.
397 See infra Table 7.
898 See supra Section III.B.
399 See supra Section III.C.
400 See Konish, supra note 394.
401 Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund Inc., Intermediate Tax Free Fund Summary Prospectus (Form 497K), 3, 8 (Jan. 26, 2016); Lord Abbett Mun. Income
Fund Inc., High Yield Municipal Bond Fund Summary Prospectus (Form
497K), 4, 9 (Jan. 26. 2016).
402 Id.
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TABLE 7
PUERTO RICAN INVESTMENTS (NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE) BY
FUNDS DISCLOSING PUERTO RICO RISKS

# Funds making
PR disclosures
Average # of PR
securities per
disclosing fund

Average %of
disclosure fund
assets invested
inPR

Bespoke Disclosures
130

Boilerplate
Disclosures
97

2015:54
2016: 76
15.13

2015:50
2016:47
4.20

2015: 6.00
2016:21.61

2015:3.53
2016:4.9

Range: 0--154

Range:0--45

#of 0 values: 24
2015:11
2016:13
6.28%

# of 0 values: 44
2015:24
2016:24
1.13%

2015:2.55%
2016:6.94%

2015:1.31%
2016:0.95%

Range: 0--42.59%

Range: 0--8.77%

IV. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS TO BOLSTER
DYNAMIC REGULATION

Funds' disclosures of investment risk stemming from both
the Puerto Rican debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic provide
some support for the conclusion that open-ended requirements
to disclose dynamic risk are working. 403
But the variation observed in these disclosures gives one
pause.404 Even considering differences in investment strategies
and portfolio risk, funds' disclosures of these risks yielded a large
degree of variation in participation and content. 405 Some funds
provided specific information about the onset and scope of the
See supra Sections II.B.3, III.B.
See supra Figure 4.
405 See infra Appendix A.B.
408

404
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pandemic or a discussion about the risk generated by the virus's
disruption of the market.406 Other funds failed to disclose any
public health risk. 407 Similarly, some Fixed Income funds disclosed
specific information about the Puerto Rican government's defaults;
others mentioned only a general risk arising from investing in
U.S. territories. 408
This Article's findings lead to the conclusion that the SEC's
open-ended requirements to disclose changing market conditions
work, but they could work better.409 The findings also suggest a
few paths forward to improve how these open-ended regulations
operate. 410 This Part provides an analytical framework-a threetiered disclosure typology-that can be used to evaluate the completeness of disclosures. 411 Drawing on individual reading of
thousands of disclosures, this Article argues that disclosures can
be sorted into three different buckets that should be familiar: (1)
generic or boilerplate statements of risk; (2) bespoke disclosures
of particularized risks; and (3) a middle category of general risk in
a particular area that rises above boilerplate but falls below an informative discussion of specific risks. 412 Theoretical support for
the typology is based on contract theory and the existing literature. 413
The SEC should be monitoring for both the frequency and
quality of disclosures. Universal disclosure of market risks both
levels the playing field for funds and helps investors more accurately compare funds' investment risk.414 But universal disclosure
See infra Appendix A.B.
See infra Appendix A.B.
40B See infra Appendix A. C.
409 See supra Section II.B.2.
41o See supra Figure 4.
m See infra Section IV.A.
412 See infra Section IV.A.l.
413 The followmg is a short list of sources that illustrate the depth of con·
tract theory discussing term variation: Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 'The Economics
of Boilerplate''), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 760 (1997); Stephen J. Choi et a!., The
Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (2017);
Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1175--79 (2006); Omri Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
389, 399--400 (2004).
414 See infra notes 498--507 and accompanying text.
406
407
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of generic risk is not enough.415 Funds must also include additional detail about the nature of the risk.416 Evaluating the distribution of these three types across fund disclosures provides a
way for the SEC to empirically evaluate fund compliance. 417
Empirically evaluating the quality of disclosures in this
way can also inform when the SEC should intervene, as it did in
the case of the Puerto Rican debt crisis, to ensure that funds are
properly disclosing default risk.418 The SEC's intervention in the
face of weak compliance is perhaps most important because it
transitions an open-ended regulation to a highly tailored rulesbased regime, in which funds are given clear guidance as to how
they should disclose emerging and particularized risk. 419 This
prevents shirking by funds, better informs investors, and provides clearer benchmarks for the SEC to evaluate compliance. 420
This Part first develops a generalized three-part typology
of disclosure specificity. 421 Next, it discusses how this typology
could be used by the SEC to better evaluate compliance with openended regulations generally and the changing market condition
disclosure requirement specifically.422 Finally, it identifies the conditions under which SEC intervention is most required.423

A. Introducing a Three-Tiered Disclosure Typology
The analysis to this point suggests that funds' disclosures
of dynamic risk can take one of three general forms. Similarly
situated funds facing the same risks may choose to disclose the
risk with specificity, as seen with bespoke COVID-19 and Puerto
Rico disclosures.424 Or a fund may rely on boilerplate statements
of risk or general statements of categorical risk.425 Finally, a
415 See Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking, 72 VAND. L. REV. 191, 210 (2019).
416 See id. at 196-97.
417 See infra Section N.B.2.
418 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 5.
419 See Ojo, supra note 81, at 26-27.
420 See McClane, supra note 415, at 211, 271.
421 See infra Section N.A.l.
422 See infra Section N.B.2
428 See infra Section N.B.3.
424 See supra Table 7.
425 See supra Table 7.

836 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:775
fund may choose a middle ground. In this situation, a fund expresses more specificity than a simple boilerplate statement of
risk but provides investors little context or information on the
extent of the risk.426
The following typology is drawn from the rich literature
on contract terms. Both contracts and disclosures are legal artifacts that rely on nuanced language to address uncertainty,
whether economic, regulatory, or legal.427 They are not, however,
a perfect match: contracts and disclosures differ in key respects.
Contracts define parties' legally enforceable rights and obligations
to each other.42B Disclosures, on the other hand, primarily serve to
share information. 429 Disclosures are also populated with terms
determined by one party only-the disclosing party-based on
guidance from a regulator.430 Contracts are a (presumably) mutually beneficial agreement between two parties. 431 Disclosures,
however, are a creature of regulation and must satisfy the regulator, among other audiences.432
See infra Table 12 and Table 13.
See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 821 (1995) (discussing the implications of network externalities on the utility of default rules in corporate contracts).
428 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981)
("A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty.'~. The classical view of contracts conceptualizes utility maximization
as the core motivator of contract terms. See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS
DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 5 (2005) (conceptualizing contracting parties as ''rational individuals who aim to achieve the highest possible payoff~;
see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003) ("Firms that maximize profits face
the canonical 'contracting problem' of ensuring both efficient ex post trade
and efficient ex ante investment in the subject matter of the contract. Parties
trade efficiently when, and only when, the value of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of performance to the seller. Parties invest
efficiently when their actions maximize a deal's expected surplus.'').
429 See Chen-Miao Lin et al., The Association Between Market Risk Disclosure Reporting and Firm Risk: The Impact of SEC FRR No. 48, 26 J. APPLIED
Bus. RscH. 35, 35 (2010) (arguing that risk disclosures' primary purpose is to
reduce information asymmetry).
480 See McClane, supra note 415, at 209.
431 See id. at 194.
482 See id. at 194--95.
426
427
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These differences aside, both share common features.433 Disclosures have quasi-contract qualities in that untrue or incomplete statements 434 trigger legal consequences: liability in courts
to defrauded investors435 and/or regulatory action.436 Furthermore,
while disclosures have a primary audience (investors), they are
also interpreted by regulators and courts much like the sophisticated parties (and, potentially, courts) that interpret contracts. 437
Adequately disclosed risks may shield a fund from investor liability,438 similar to the protection full disclosure in the representation
and warranty schedules provides in M&A deals. 439

1. Three General Types of Contract Term Specificity
The similarity between contracts and disclosures suggests
that contract theory may be able to demonstrate something about
when and why one is likely to observe variation in disclosure
language specificity.440 Contract language falls into three basic tiers, similar to what was observed with the case studies: bespoke
433 This Article is not the first to look to contract theory to understand disclosure patterns. See id. at 194--99.
434 Funds that fail to adequately describe risks may leave the fund open to
liability for securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the
"misstatement or omission concealed something from the market that, when
disclosed, negatively affected the value of the security." Youngers v. Virtus Inv.
Partners, 195 F. Supp. 3d 499, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Lentell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)).
435 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, investorplaintiffs can maintain a claim of securities fraud only if they can "prove (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and purchase or sale
of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Id. (citing Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown
LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2010)).
436 See, e.g., McClane, supra note 415, at 197-98 (finding that more boilerplate is associated with lower legal costs, but not with lower auditing fees or
underwriting fees, time to completion, SEC scrutiny, or future amendments).
437 See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1791, 1812--16 (2019) (discussing interpretation of forum selection terms).
43B See McClane, supra note 415, at 202--04.
439 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & Warranty Insurance in Mergers & Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2020) (discussing the role of representations and warranties in merger agreements).
440 See infra notes 469--73 and accompanying text.
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terms, open-ended general standards,441 and generic boilerplate.442
Each tier serves a function in the contract.443 Bespoke terms telegraph unique and often important information. 444 Open-ended
standards445 facilitate bargains today despite uncertainty about
tomorrow, thus conversing transaction costs and avoiding deadlock. 446 Generic boilerplate, the least specific of the tiers, acts as
a liability shield that increases predictability while minimizing
transaction costs.447
When entering a contract, parties may craft bespoke terms,
such as a schedule of performance on the contract and damages
in the event of default. 448 While presumably well-tailored to the
specific transaction at hand, such precisely negotiated terms may
be costly to craft. 449 For example, a contract between two manufacturing firms engaging in a joint venture may lay out a specific
research and development ("R&D") schedule and require certain
manufacturing or development milestones to be reached by a
certain date. Such terms are unique to the parties, would be nonsensical in any other agreement, and speak directly to the parties' knowledge of the risks involved in the collaboration.
But the future may be difficult to predict-so difficult that
negotiating efficient bespoke terms may appear to be a fool's errand.450 Parties can smooth over the rough edge of uncertainty
This section compares open·ended contract standards to the general,
categorical disclosures observed in public health and Puerto Rico.
442 See Bespoke Contracts: Everything You Need to Klww, UPCOUNSEL (Nov. 16,
2020), https://www.upcounsel.com/bespoke·contracts [https://perma.cc/3ES5
-38MP]; Contract, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Boilerplate, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
443 See infra notes 444, 446--47 and accompanying text.
444 Bespoke Contracts: Everything You Need to Know, supra note 442.
445 The previous section described the changing market condition disclosure
requirement as an open·ended regulation. Changing market conditions, like
best efforts, addresses future uncertainty that makes it too costly for the SEC
to list everything today that may be required, given a changing and unknown
set of events to occur, tomorrow.
446 Open-Ended Agreement Definition, DUHAIME'S L. DICTIONARY, https:/1
www.duhaime.org/Legai·Dictionarytrerm/OpenEndedAgreement [https://perma
.cc/335C-KTAZ].
447 See Chen, supra note 373.
448 Bespoke Contract definition, L. INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com/dic
tionary/bespoke-contract [https://perma.cc/84WW·V7RV].
449 See Bespoke Contracts: Everything You Need to Know, supra note 442.
450 See id.
441
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using open-ended terms, such as "reasonableness" or "good-faith
effort" to govern uncertainty when the parties cannot reach an
agreement on bespoke terms or bespoke terms are inappropriate
given the parties' assessment of economic or regulatory uncertainty.451 In other words, open-ended terms help reduce transaction costs. For example, the manufacturing joint venture described
above may involve a great deal of uncertainty about when or
even whether jointly undertaken R&D will be successful.452 In
that case, specific schedules and drop-dead dates may be inappropriate. The firms in this example may be better served by
open-ended standards that require "best efforts" to develop the
product within a "reasonable" length of time. 453
Finally, parties may minimize costs and address uncertainty by including generic boilerplate.454 Boilerplate terms are
standardized, well-accepted, and frequently used terms and clauses,
such as mandatory arbitration agreements, that carry an agreedupon or shared meaning.455 Parties can be confident in their
courts' interpretations of these terms, as judges tend to "treat
[boilerplate] as intentionally standardized and not harboring unusual meanings."456
Boilerplate is especially appropriate when parties are attempting to ameliorate risk common to all transactions. 457 Want
451 Open-ended terms, such as "reasonable" or "good faith," are commonly
used terms, but do not have a precise definition. For example, the Third Circuit has noted that "'[b]est efforts' has been widely held to be an ambiguous
contract term'' because it has "two or more reasonable meanings." Martin v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2001).
452 See discussion supra Section IV .A.l.
453 See supra note 451 and accompanying text.
454 See Chen, supra note 373.
455 Id. The term ''boilerplate'' is also used to describe terms or language
that is cut and pasted from one contract to another. Id. Legally meaningful
boilerplate language, as described in this paragraph, is necessarily "cut and
pasted'' from contract to contract. Id. Repeated use over time is precisely
what provides the language with meaning. But other language can also be
copied from contract to contract without having any real legal meaning, such
as the description of a company or a product. Id. Firms may use standard
descriptions for the sake of consistency, but these firm-specific clauses have
no intrinsic legal meaning and are excluded from our definition of "boilerplate." McClane, supra note 415, at 195-96 (examining a dataset of 2, 751
IPOs for operating companies taking place between 1996 and 2015).
466 Smith, supra note 413, at 1176.
457 See Chen, supra note 373.
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to guard against the risk that a hurricane will destroy a plant or
an earthquake will disrupt a production schedule? A standard
''force majeure" clause is the parties' best bet in this case. 458
Need to ensure the contract is enforceable even if a single provision within the contract is deemed to be void? Add a standard
severability clause.459
Boilerplate language is useful in these types of situations
because the standardized nature of the language entails low transaction costs.460 These terms' catchall nature provides a liability
shield to the parties at a low cost, facilitating transactions at a
mass scale. 461 Boilerplate language in contracts have prompted a
scholarly firestorm, garnering everything from praise (for facilitating contracts in the presence of asymmetric information and
knowledge to enable the growth of mass consumer markets 462) to
scorn (as the foundation for "contracts of adhesion" that ''take advantage of consumers' weaknesses'').463 This Article offers neither.
This discussion notes only that these terms are common "gap-fillers"
in contracts characterized by deep informational asymmetry. 464
458 See Smith, supra note 413, at 1191 (highlighting the value of boilerplate language in contracts).
459 Id. at 1194.
460 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Clwice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261, 262 (1985) (noting that default contract terms reduce transaction costs by providing parties with standardized and generally applicable
''preformulations'l The utility of boilerplate terms have been the subject of
much controversy and scrutiny given the baggage that comes with this term.
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 817, 836-38 (2006) (discussing the cost effects
of boilerplate); cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91
(1989) (arguing that default rules should be unfavorable to incentivize the
parties to design their own transaction-specific terms).
461 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 413, at 718.
462 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts
in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (arguing that
one-sided contracts containing boilerplate language are necessary in facilitating the growth of mass consumer markets and can be balanced in execution if
firms are motivated by reputations! concerns).
468 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004).
464 See supra notes 22--23 and accompanying text. Such terms exist to facilitate the transaction and, by extension, the existence of the market itself.
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Taken together, these three types of contract termsbespoke, open-ended, and boilerplate-give parties a range of language to define rights and ameliorate risk within their limited
ability to forecast future political, social, and economic events that
may affect the parties' relationship. Next, this Article superimposes this framework on mutual fund disclosure language to
explain the variation observed in our changing market condition
case studies.465

2. Rooting Disclosure Language in Contract Theory
Findings from the empirical analysis indicate that, like
contract language, disclosure language falls into three basic tiers:
bespoke, general standards, and generic boilerplate. 466 Rooting
disclosure language in contract theory can help demonstrate why
and when funds deploy each of these categories of language. 467
This, in turn, aids regulatory efforts to promote universal disclosure
of new and emerging market risks, as well as providing some guidance to the SEC about when an intervention may be necessary.46B
Bespoke terms telegraph unique information to investors
pinpointing specific strategies and risks. 469 Bespoke disclosures
may be appropriate when a fund is heavily invested in a particular geographic area. For example, recall that funds with comparatively high Puerto Rico investments made bespoke disclosures, compared to funds with lower Puerto Rico investments
and which made boilerplate disclosures. 470 Parties to a contract
are likely to employ bespoke terms when describing known risk
or an obligation specific to a particular agreement.471 Funds too
Arguably, mass consumer markets wouldn't exist (or would look very, very
dllferent) if buyers and sellers were forced to accrue transaction costs from
negotiating a separate contract for each sale. Cf. Chen, supra note 373 (sug·
gesting that few sellers would enter the markets if every contract had the
possibility of unconstrained liability).
465 See infra Section N.A.2.
466 See infra Table 12.
467 See infra notes 469--73 and accompanying text.
46B See infra notes 527-28 and accompanying text.
469 See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
470 Bespoke Contracts: Everything You Need to Know, supra note 442; see
infra Table 14.
471 See infra Table 13 and Table 14.
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may choose to make bespoke disclosures when event-specific information is available to funds.472 Consider funds' disclosure of
the Puerto Rican debt crisis. The number of bespoke disclosures
increased, and more generic disclosures decreased as the crisis
slowly unfolded.473
This trend is observable outside of the case studies as well. 474
For example, one fund heavily invested in the software/hardware
sector noted that "[c]ompetitive pressures may have a significant
effect on the fmancial condition of companies in the software
and hardware sectors .... [M]any of the products and services
offered by software and hardware companies are subject to the
risks of short product cycles and rapid obsolescence." 475
But not every fund chooses to make bespoke disclosures. 476
Some instead choose general statements or boilerplate disclosure
language. 477 Here again, understanding how parties to a contract
employ such terms is useful. Recall that parties use general
statement and open-ended terms to describe obligations that are
difficult to define using specific language.47B For example, instead of
including a schedule of performance in the contract, parties instead may require ''reasonable best efforts."479 Similarly, funds may
not know enough about a changing market condition and its effects
to compose a highly specific statement of risk.4BO They simply may
not have sufficient information to make a tailored disclosure. 481
Funds may also attempt to adapt general, well-accepted
language to describe a new and emerging risk. 482 This may act
See infra Table 13 and Table 14.
See infra Table 14. The COVID-19 case study is limited by one year of
data, but one could imagine more bespoke disclosures, more topic variation,
and more detail in the disclosures over time.
474 See, e.g., Claymore ETF Trust (EDGAR) (Oct. 3, 2008).
475 Id.
476 See infra Figure 2; supra notes 249--50 and accompanying text.
477 See infra Figure 2; supra notes 249--50 and accompanying text.
478 See supra notes 450--51 and accompanying text.
479 See supra notes 450--51 and accompanying text.
480 See Kenneth Kiesnoski, These Are the Changes and Challenges Keeping
Advisors Up at Night, CNBC (Oct. 17, 2019, 8:11 AM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2019/1011 7/these-are-the-changes-and-challenges-keeping-top-advisors-up-at
-night.html [https://perma.cc/Z2N8-F2C9].
481 See id.
482 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 413, at 718--21. For example, a fund
may disclose a general ''investment style risk" by explaining that it uses a
472

473
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to normalize the risk and blunt investor concern over the investment risk caused by the changing market condition.483 These
terms may be attractive to firms because general, open-ended
statements of investment risk or strategy fill in the gaps and
smooth over the rough edge of uncertainty about the scope of a
risk or how it will unfold. 484 Like in contracts, general statements
of risk offer low-cost liability shields. 485 Examples of general disclosure statements include the risk of losing money, exposure to
markets, and for foreign investments the exposure to political
and economic conditions abroad. 486
But firms don't universally comply with the SEC's requirement to disclose changing market conditions.487 Using general language reflects an attempt to shield a fund from liability
for undisclosed risks.488 General risk statements balance regulator
and investor concerns.489 If the needle is thread accurately, a
fund can disclose a risk to shield it from liability without scaring
off potential investors. 490
growth style. Investment Risks, BAIRD, https://content.rwbaird.com/RWB/Con
tentJPDF/Help!Baird-Investment-Risks-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UNW
-9GVN]. This means that a fund seeks to increase investor capital, usually by
investing in stocks expected to grow above market averages. See, e.g., Glossary,
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/910180/000106880000000231
/000 1068800-00-000231-000l.htm [https://perma.cc/2YRR-RDKT]. To hedge
that specific risk, however, the fund cautions investors that "[t]hose styles may
be out offavor or may not produce the best results over shorter or longer time
periods." AXA Premier VIP Trust (Form 497K) (May 2, 2008). The fund notes
a specific risk-investment style risk-but uses categorical and generalized
terms to describe the nature of the risk ("may be out of style" and "may not
produce results over short or longer time periods'} Id.
483 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 413, at 71S-21.
484 See id.
485 Id. at 718.
486 See Investment Risks, supra note 482.
487 See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led To or
Arose From the Financial Crisis, SEC (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/spot
light/enf-actions-fc.shtml [https://perma.cc/8YNZ-HYRQ].
488 See Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting Reform From the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65
VILL. L. REV. 67, 110 (2020) (surveying SEC filed comments and reporting that
over-disclosure of risk factors and generic or boilerplate disclosures are "due
to fear of liability, and certain investors and other respondents agreed that these
same concerns also lead companies to under-disclose firm-specific risks").
489 See id.
490 See id.
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Funds' use of generic or boilerplate language may serve a
similar purpose. Boilerplate disclosure language, like boilerplate
in contracts, reduces transaction costs.491 Transaction costs for
disclosures entail the cost of market monitoring, drafting and
updating disclosures in response to changing market conditions,
and filing disclosures with the SEC.492 Generic or general language simply requires less updating and refiling.493 Stability in
the language of a disclosure also reflects stability in the funds'
investments and minimizes the perception that the fund may
lose money. 494
Disclosures must simultaneously woo prospective participants (investors) while disclosing enough risk to create a liability
shield and satisfy regulators. 495 This creates a tension in disclosures. Funds seek to increase fund share sales--an activity that
requires optimism by investors about returns--while satisfying
the SEC's requirements that funds "should clearly disclose the
fundamental characteristics and investment risks of the Fund,
using concise, straightforward, and easy to understand language."496 In balancing these two opposing forces, disclosures must
also be complete enough in their descriptions of risk to forestall
an investor lawsuit following a drop in NAV or other metrics of
the security's value.497
See Chen, supra note 373.
See Sean Ross, How Mutual Fund Companies Make Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 8, 2021), https:l/www.investopedia.rom/articles/investing/092415/how
-mutual-fund-rompanies-make-money.asp [https://perma.cc/CVR4-5EL5].
493 See Chen, supra note 373.
494 See id.
495 See Robert C. Pozen & Theresa Hamacher, Complex Funds Need Better
Risk Disclosure, BROOKINGS (May 5, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/opin
ions/complex-funds-need-better-risk-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/DZM:3-785A].
496 SEC Form N-1A, supra note 8, at item 1(a): Administration of the Form
N-1A requirements.
497 See id. Note that the fund's NAV (i.e., the share price) and the value of
the fund are two different things. In Youngers v. Virtus Inv. Partners, the
Court explained:
In situations where a change in value is not necessarily represented by a rorresponding cltange in price, a rourt must shift its
focus to something other than price in determining whether a
misstatement "negatively affected the value of a security." ...
Suclt a valuation process is neither onerous nor exceptional;
investors make an independent determination of vslue each time
they purchase a mutual fund share. Indeed, it is an axiom of
491
492
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Funds satisfy these competing audiences498 by engaging
in a form of constrained optimization when writing disclosures. 499
Bespoke terms describing risk may be inefficient given these opposing audiences, even when the risk is well known, as with
COVID-19. 500 Specific descriptions of risk may create a red flag
for investors, prompting questions about why a particular fund
is plagued by risks unlike those of its peers.50l
Consider the flxed income funds holding forty or more
Puerto Rican assets in 2016 that only made boilerplate disclosure
about Puerto Rico risk. 502 An investor reading that disclosure,
compared to the bespoke disclosures made by funds with similar
Puerto Rican investors, could estimate very different risks for
microeconomics that a party will not purchase an item if its
value does not exceed its price. With securities, investors con·
sider the expected future value of an investment and pur·
chase securities when the discounted present value exceeds
the price. To make this assessment, investors look to a myriad
of factors, which, for example, can include risk and performance history. A material misrepresentation of any of these
factors could lead to an inflated valuation of security.
195 F. Supp. 499, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)).
49B Regulators may desire specific descriptions of risk to make the disclosure as informative as possible for investors. The SEC discourages the use of
boilerplate in mutual fund and operating company disclosures. See, e.g., SEC,
DN. OF CORP. FIN., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, Cybersecurity (Oct. 13,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfln/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm
[https://perma.cc/9V6B-B9CH] (discouraging the use of boilerplate); SEC, DN.
OF lNv. MGMT., DISCLOSURE REV. & ACCT. OFF., ADI 2019-08-IMPROVING
PRINCIPAL RISKS DISCLOSURE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/investment
/accounting-and-disclosure-information/principal-risks/adi·2019-08·improving
-principal-risks-disclosure [https://perma.cc/E3YH-K786] (discouraging the use of
boilerplate). Specificity might increase the litigation shield. McClane, supra
note 415, at 197--98 (finding that increased boilerplate was not associated with
increased SEC scrutiny of !PO registration statements, but noting that increased boilerplate is associated with pricing gaps and market inefficiencies
which may in turn trigger regulatory scrutiny).
499 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14--18 (2003) (discussing anchoring and optimism in
the context of SEC disclosures).
600 See supra Part II.
'"' Cf McClane, supra note 415, at 195--96; see also Edward A. Morse et
a!., SEC Cybersecurity Guidelines: Insights into the Utility of Risk Factor Disclosures for Investors, 73 Bus. L. 1, 34 (2018) (presenting evidence that investors
punished firm that added new cybersecurity risk statements to disclosures).
002 See supra Part IV.
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the otherwise similarly situated funds.soa From this lens, funds
have little incentive to raise investor fears and scare off the wary
or uninformed.504 Cautious funds might opt for a more general
and open-ended statement of risk.
From the fund's perspective, boilerplate language best exploits the information asymmetry between the fund and its investors. Regulators and courts-the most sophisticated interpreters
of the disclosure--may see boilerplate as "a type of modular language--a settled formulation of a set of ideas or information-that
can be easily recognized and understood by its intended audience."505 Common understandings can shield a fund from regulatory and judicial scrutiny.sos But relatively unsophisticated
investors may not interpret these decidedly milquetoast phrases
as containing any particularly worrisome risk.so7

B. Improving the Regulation of Dynamic Risk
The cost and benefits of various disclosure types suggest that
the SEC's open-ended requirement to disclose changing market
conditions could be improved by assessing regulatory success based
on the distribution of these disclosure types across funds. This
Article makes three specific recommendations. First, the SEC should
empirically assess fund disclosures for compliance by assessing
whether funds have disclosed any risk of a changing market
conditions. 5os Next, the SEC should develop event-specific methods to evaluate the distribution of disclosure type.sog Finally, if
funds have largely failed to inform investors of specific risks, the
SEC should intervene and provide guidance that transforms the
open-ended disclosure regime to a rules-based one.51o
See supra Part IV.
Other examples of boilerplate disclosures are observable outside of
changing market conditions. For example, a fund may disclose a general ''investment style risk" by explaining that it uses a growth style. See, e.g., Claymore
ETF Trust, supra note 474.
505 McClane, supra note 415, at 195.
503 See id. at 232.
507 Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and
Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 503 (2007).
508 See supra Introduction.
508 See supra Part II.
510 See supra Part I.
503
504
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1. Determine Universal Compliance
Determining whether funds have disclosed any risk related
to changing market conditions is the first task. The two case
studies in this Article indicate that some funds simply fail to disclose any risk that could be construed as disclosing changing
market conditions. 51! Failure to disclose changed or changing market conditions, once in play, is a clear violation of the SEC's
principles-based disclosures. 512
The SEC should enforce disclosure through staff comments
on filing reviews on an ad hoc basis. The SEC should also systematically evaluate disclosure keywords and topics to identify
compliance outliers and statistically significant variation in disclosures.513 Leveraging keyword lists may create a check-the-box
approach to nuanced disclosures. 514 Adding in tools like cosine
similarity515 to compare disclosure text before and after the changed
condition may help the SEC identify outlier funds that are not
(but should be) changing their disclosure text.516
2. Evaluate Compliance Quality

Universal compliance, however, is only the first step to determining meaningful compliance-that is, compliance with both
the letter and the spirit of the law. 517 Disclosures of dynamic
risk, like changing market conditions, should not just serve as a
liability shield for the fund but also inform the average investor.518 Disclosures that offer only boilerplate language perform
the former goal while failing to achieve the latter.519
The SEC could further leverage any automated and/or
keyword-based processes to sort disclosed dynamic risk into one
See infra Table 12.
Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 2--3; see also Fenwick et
a!., supra note 23, at 590.
618 See supra notes 262--90 and accompanying text describing the variation
in COVID disclosure topics.
514 See infra Table 12.
515 See infra Tables 15, 16, and 17.
516 See infra Table 12.
517 See infra Table 12.
51B See infra Table 12.
519 See infra Table 12.
511
512
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of three categories: bespoke, general, or boilerplate.520 The SEC
could then determine what level of disclosure satisfied its requirements for any particular event. 521 For example, the SEC could
evaluate 2020 disclosure data to conclude that (1) funds had failed
to universally comply with the mandate and (2) enough was
known about the risk by the end of the year to merit a more par·
ticularized disclosure of COVID-specific risk by those funds
providing only a boilerplate public health risk. 522
Applying this three-tiered typology of risk disclosure could
have also led the SEC to intervene earlier in the Puerto Rican
debt crisis. Recall that Puerto Rico had been overextended for
years and showed the first serious signs that it may default on
its debt in 2014.523 Yet, most funds issued general or boilerplate
risk disclosures even when the risk was clear. 524 In 2015, more
funds began making bespoke disclosures, but this number barely
exceeded the number of firms making general and boilerplate
disclosures. 525 Only after the SEC intervened in 2016 did the
number of bespoke disclosures dramatically increase. 526

3. Intervene When Empirical Measures Indicate a Lack of
Meaningful Compliance
Finally, the SEC should bolster gap-filling disclosure re·
quirements like the changing market condition with timely and
tailored guidance. SEC guidance elevates open-ended standards
to principles-based requirements, or in the case with Puerto Rico, a
clear rule. 527 The SEC should leverage its disclosure framework
and advance regulations from vague, hypothetical obligations to
disclose risks if something bad happens, to clearer standards when
the crisis has arrived. Moving into more formalistic, concrete
guidance from the SEC makes clearer funds' compliance obliga·
tions and lays a path for SEC enforcement. 528
See infra Table 12.
See infra Table 16.
522 See supra notes 268, 487.
523 Lubben, supra note 331, at 568-78.
524 See supra Figure 5.
525 See supra Figure 5.
626 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19.
627 Id.
628 See, e.g., Ojo, supra note 81, at 13, 20--21.
520
621
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As observed with the Puerto Rico data, more funds disclosed following SEC guidance, and more funds issued bespoke
disclosures. 529 While the number of funds disclosing COVID-19
and public health risks dramatically increased in 2020, with
nearly fifty percent of funds not disclosing public health risks,
disclosures likely underestimate the risks of the pandemic. Further, public health boilerplate and general statements may be
sufficient liability shields, but they do little to extend the mission of SEC disclosures: informing ordinary investors. 530 Despite
the widespread personal experience with the pandemic, clear
statements connecting public health risks to investment risks
may still be necessary, or at least helpful. As demonstrated in
the topic model, there is nuance to the financial risks brought on
by the pandemic. 531
SEC guidance would also help free funds stuck in the disclosure disincentive. Economically speaking, a fund should disclose
exactly the amount of risk necessary to satisfy regulators (i.e.,
boilerplate) but no more. 532 This minimizes the possibility of scaring
off investors. 533 SEC guidance would help strike the right balance by tipping the scales in favor of fulsome disclosure. 534 Clear
rules-based guidance would also normalize disclosing the risk
among funds and decrease investor stigma or fear for making
the disclosure. 535
SEC guidance should be tailored by fund type. 536 The
analysis of COVID-specific disclosures provided evidence that
disclosed risks tend to vary by fund type. 537 This likely reflects
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15.
531 See supra notes 288-99 and accompanying text.
632 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
533 See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
684 See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
636 See S-K Final Rules, supra note 6, at 8.
536 See supra note 311 and accompanying text. More specific disclosures
may help investors better understand the likelihood of loss. Choi & Pritchard,
supra note 499, at 12. Drawing generally from behavioral economics literature, a
nudge by the SEC may help to appropriately balance investor biases such as
over-optimism and anchoring. Id.; see also Manne, supra note 507, at 477
(arguing that investor reaction to risk disclosure is not necessarily rational
and that investors interpret information through their own cognitive biases).
587 See supra Section II.B.4.
629

5ao
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systematic variation in portfolio holdings: different types of funds
are exposed to different types of risk.538 SEC guidance about
COVID-19 and future events should be tailored to fund type, like
commodity effects for Fixed Income funds, consumer demand and
supply chain disruption on Domestic Equity and Index funds,
and the global regulatory response for Foreign Equity funds. 539
Topic modeling early disclosures could, as reported in Part II,
identify areas of agreement among disclosing funds about the
major risks to shape SEC guidance and enforcement efforts. 540
Furthermore, the SEC should continue to enforce disclosure compliance even after issuing guidance. Intervention without monitoring does not ensure compliance. For example, the
data show that, even after the SEC issued guidance in 2016,
some funds with Puerto Rico investments did not make the recommended disclosures, opting instead for the mildest boilerplate
language.541 This variation is unmoored from economic reality.
In this situation, the fund making boilerplate disclosures had
the same significant risk as the funds making bespoke disclosures.542 This type of variation undermines the reliability of disclosures.543 Investors cannot depend on disclosures to accurately
signal the risk associated with an investment in the face of calculated under-reporting.544 The call to SEC action is strong: mutual fund markets operate outside price arbitrage and takeover
threats that could otherwise punish weak disclosures. 545 In this
environment, SEC intervention takes on greater importance.
CONCLUSION

This Article finds evidence that SEC open-ended regulations,
like changing market conditions, are largely successful in regulating dynamic, future risk. 546 These regulations fill a regulatory
See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
See supra note 536 and accompanying text.
640 See supra Section II.B.4.
541 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
542 See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
543 See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
644 See supra notes 35--36 and accompanying text.
546 Spamann, supra note 4 7, at 14.
646 See Romano, supra note 22, at 27-28.
538
689
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gap when unforeseen events, like COVID-19, occur.547 While imperfect, the evidence of both case studies suggests widespread
compliance by funds. 548 Further, the data show that funds use
the disclosure channels to communicate important information to
investors. Many funds provide tailored and fulsome accounts of
investment risks, and for many funds, the choice to do so is tied to
the portfolio investments. 549 In this light, the SEC's disclosure framework successfully promotes funds' disclosure of dynamic risks.550
But the data also tell another story. While many funds
disclose changing market conditions, not all do.551 The open-ended
regulations, by themselves, are incomplete.552 Not every fund
participates, and even among those that do, there is wide variation in the specificity of the disclosure. 553
Variation undermines the SEC's regulatory framework for
funds, which hinges on disclosure.554 If some funds fail to meaningfully disclose dynamic risk, investors cannot rely on such disclosures to distinguish between two investment opportunities. 555
When variation is allowed, perverse incentives creep in, discouraging funds to make fulsome disclosures for fear of scaring off
investors. 556 This Article recommends SEC interventions to mitigate variation: (1) monitor disclosures for universal compliance
by affected funds, (2) categorically evaluate disclosure content, (3)
issue tailored and timely guidance when there is variation in
fund participation and disclosure content, and (4) enforce disclosure compliance following guidance.557 These four measures would
elevate the open-ended regulations into more formalistic rules
once a new crisis arises, making clear disclosure obligations for
funds and enforcement opportunities for the SEC.55B
See id.
Supra Parts II and III.
549 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
550 Supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
661 See supra Section II.B.4; Section III.B.
662 See supra Section II.B.4; Section III.B.
553 See supra notes 31-33.
554 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
555 See Current Market Conditions, supra note 19, at 1.
666 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
567 Supra Section IV.B.
668 Supra Section IV.B.
547
548
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APPENDIX A: DATA AND METHODS

Additional details on the data collection, labeling and analysis procedures are provided below.

A. Data Sample Construction and Description
This Article uses mutual fund disclosures from 2010-2020
to study the SEC's open-ended regulation of funds to disclose
changing market conditions. Two case studies focus the review:
COVID-19 and the Puerto Rican debt crisis.
Table 8 describes the beginning data sample, what filings
were dropped and why (file size too small, no principal risk, or a
duplicate filing), and the number of public health and Puerto
Rico filings. Part II in the Article provides additional details. In
preprocessing, all words were made lower case, and special characters such as: ?f"\.&\.A\.%\.$\#*\.@() were removed and replaced
with blank spaces. Punctuation contained in a standard set of
abbreviations was also ignored. 559
TABLES
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION & DATA LOSS
Total filings 201o-2020
Filings after dropping for missing principal risk and
small file sale
De-duplicate filings (keeping the last filing per year)
Number of public health filings in sample
Number of Puerto Rico filings in sample

213,861
164,602

98,290
7,998
1,332

559 These abbreviations include the following terms: i.e., U.S., e.g., etc., J.P.,
Inc., LLC., Co., J.p., ltd., S.E.C., Inv. Co. Act, months (such as Sept., Dec., Jan.,
Nov., Oct., Aug., Feb., etc.), vs., dr., mr., mrs., and ms. For example, the abbreviation U.S. to describe investment in U.S. companies would be changed to ''us"
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Open-ended filing funds were categorized by merging
scraped prospectus data with the CRSP Survivor Bias Free U.S.
Mutual Fund Database investment objective codes to categorize
open-ended filing funds.560 Six broad CRSP categories were used
to group funds in like-asset classes: domestic equity (DE), foreign equity (FE), fixed income (FI), money market (M), index (1),
and other. Funds with no CRSP codes were grouped in the "missing'' category. Within the sample, Domestic Equity funds and Index funds together make up forty-seven percent of the sample. See
the distribution of fund types in Table 9 for additional sample data.
TABLE9

DISCLOSURE COUNTS BY YEAR AND FuND TYPE 2010-2020

~
d

Domestic

Equity

Foreign

Equity
Fixed

Income

Index

Money
Market
Others

Missing

CRSPCode

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

'16

'17

'18

'19

'20

1308

1746

1939

2196

2370

2624

2697

2796

2766

2746

2617

34%

32%

31%

31%

31%

30%

30%

30%

29%

29%

29%

661

722

830

966

1070

1186

1279

1319

1328

1309

1226

14%

13%

13%

14%

14%

14%

14%

14%

14%

14%

13%

473

574

619

652

657

692

714

731

726

729

711

12%

11%

10%

9%

9%

8%

8%

8%

8%

8%

8%

326

686

805

951

1070

1295

1498

1700

1909

1996

1958

8%

13%

13%

13%

14%

15%

16%

18%

20%

21%

21%

363

473

544

626

685

743

793

796

761

770

710

9%

9%

9%

9%

9%

9%

9%

8%

8%

8%

8%

866

1230

1440

1664

1833

1996

2104

2110

2076

2070

1926

22%

23%

23%

24%

24%

24%

23%

22%

22%

22%

21%

1676

1777

1677

1478

1332

1061

718

638

619

770

1211

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

nla

560 Note the CRSP database excludes closed end funds and other registered investment vehicles that are not mutual funds, bonds, international
equities, or money market funds. See CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SECURlTY

PRICES, DATA DESCRIPTIONS GUIDE, CRSP US STOCK AND US INDEX DATABASES 4 (Feb. 2021).
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8%

14%

• Domestic Equity • Index • Foragn Ecp.uty • Fixed Income

Money Market

Other

FIGURE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF FuND TYPES IN DATA SAMPLE
2010--2020 EXCLUDING MISSING CRSP DATA

B. Public Health Disclosure Data, Labeling, and Description
Here the count of public health data across the sample by
year and fund type is provided. Table 10 reports sentence level
data. Table 11 reports disclosure data and provides proportions.
TABLE10
COUNT OF PuBLIC HEALTH SENTENCES BY CRSP CATEGORY AND

YEAR 2010-2020

~
Typ

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

'16

'17

'18

'19

'20

Domestic
Equity

1

12

3

14

17

21

33

18

47

34

3068

Index

1

14

17

21

27

26

36

36

32

42

2849

Foreign
Equity

1

2

3

2

0

6

11

10

11

15

1493

Fixed Income

1

2

4

1

2

1

3

3

3

2

1073

Money

2

12

18

21

33

46

50

39

39

61

872
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~

'11

'10

Typ

Others

Missing crsp

class

'12

'13

'14

'15

'16

'17

'18

'19

'20

5

16

22

29

52

73

87

81

86

96

2353

1576

1777

1677

1478

1332

1051

718

538

619

770

1211

TABLE 11
COUNT AND PROPORTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURES BY
CRSP CLASS AND YEAR 2010--2020

~

'19

'20

46
1.66
10
0.75
3
0.41
30
1.57

34
1.24
13
0.99
2
0.27
40
2.00

1365
52.16
658
53.71
395
55.56
1235
63.07

36
4.52
76
3.60
133

38
4.99
80
3.85
77

48
6.23
91
4.40
37

399
56.20
958
49.77
885

11.98

24.72

12.44

4.81

73.08

300

307

284

265

5895

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

1
0.08
1
0.18
1
0.21
1
0.31

12
0.69
2
0.28
2
0.35
14
2.04

3
0.15
3
0.36
3
0.48
17
2.11

14
0.64
2
0.21
1
0.15
21
2.21

17
0.72
0
0.00
2
0.30
27
2.52

21
0.83
6
0.51
1
0.14
25
1.93

33
1.22
8
0.63
3
0.42
35
2.34

17
0.61
7
0.53
3
0.41
35
2.06

2
0.55
5
0.58
39

12
2.54
16
1.30
73

18
3.31
22
1.53
85

21
3.35
28
1.68
80

33
4.82
52
2.84
69

43
5.79
69
3.46
83

50
6.31
85
4.04
86

%

2.47

4.11

5.07

5.41

5.18

7.90

Totals

50

131

151

167

200

248

DE Count
%

FE Count
%

FI Count
%

Index Count
%

MMCount
%

Others Count
%

Missing
Count

'16

'17

'18

A combination of hand coding and computer coding gen-

erated the public health labels. Table 12 outlines the rules and
conditions for the labels.
TABLE12
PuBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURE LABELING RULES
Label
Bespoke:
COVIDspecific

Rule

Additional keywords
Sentence Review
H sentence contains
covid, coronavirus, this
covid-specifi.c
keywords, pandemic, the pandemic, this
then sentence = "COVill- global pandemic, the global
specific''
pandemic, this outbreak, this
VIrUS

856 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:775
Label

General
Public
Health

Boilerplate:
General
Laundry
List

Label
Bespoke:
COVIDspecific

General
Public
Health

Rule
Additional keywords
If the sentence conillness, epidemic, comtains neither covid-specific municable disease, sars, public
health
screening,
keywords nor general health,
laundry list terms and quarantine, virus, hiv, respiracontains one or more pub- tory, health crises, prevention,
lic health keyword then mers, health crisis, hlnl,
global health, sanitation, pansentence = "General PH"
demic,
disease,
influenza,
pathogen, health risk, outbreak, travel restriction, contagion
political upheaval, social
If the sentence does
not contain covid-specific unrest, war, terrorism, terror
keywords but does contain attack, financial trouble, fi.
at least one public health nancial market, natural disaskeyword and contains ter, environmental disaster,
more than one general country instability, political
laundry list keyword then event, civil unrest, national
sentence= "General Laun- election, exchange controls,
social event, economic event,
dry List"
economic development, labor
strike, inflation, geopolitical,
economic,
political,
pamc,
environmental, social, regional, recession, regulatory development, interest rate, currency
rate, military confrontation,
corporate earnings, corporate
revenue, security concern,
international relation, cybersecurity, technological, weather,
pollution, cyber, hack, hacking,
attack
Disclosure Labels
Rule
Additional keywords
If any sentence in the
n/a
disclosure 1s labeled Bespoke:
COVID-Specific
then the filing is labeled as
Bespoke: COVID-Specific.
If no sentence is lanla
beled Bespoke: COVIDSpecific in a filing and 1 or
more sentences are labeled
General Public health then
the filing is labeled General Public health.
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Label

Boilerplate:
General
Laundry
List

Rule
If no sentence is Iabeled Bespoke: COVIDSpecific or General Public
health and one of more
sentence is labeled as
Boilerplate: General Laundry list then the disclosure
is labeled Boilerplate:
General Laundry list.
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Additional keywords
nla

C. Puerto Rico Data, Labeling, and Description
Hand coding was used to generate the Puerto Rico disclosure labels only because the sample size was smaller, but it
spanned a longer range of time. Triggering conditions for one
label versus another involved more judgment than the keyword
conditions of the public health rules and thus were harder to
reduce to programmable rules. The following table outlines the
general coding guidelines for the Puerto Rico data. Table 14 reports the labeled data by year.
TABLE 13
PUERTO RICAN DISCLOSURE LABELING RULES HERE

Bespoke: PR warning/default
The commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
Label is fund discloses spe- its related issuers continue to experience
cific facts of the PR financial financial difficulties and rating agency
crisis such as the negative downgrades, and numerous issuers have
watch, junk bonds and de- entered title iii of the Puerto Rico overfaults.
sight, management and economic stability
act, which is similar to bankruptcy protection, through which the commonwealth of
Puerto Rico can restructure its debt. Puerto
Rico's short-term financial difficulties were
further impacted by a hurricane in 2017.
Boilerplate: General u.s.
To the extent the fund holds any muterritory
nicipal securities of issuers in Guam, PuerLabel if fund only men- to Rico, the U.S. virgin islands, or other
tioned Puerto Rico as a part of U.S. territories, the fund may lose some or
a general U.S. territory risk all of the value of those investments.
statement, but provided no
facts about the crisis or clear
indication that the fund IS
invested in PR.
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General PR territory
Label if fund identifies
unique risks to investments in
Puerto Rico without identifying
the financial crisis, or without
a clear indication that the fund
is currently invested in PR.

Puerto Rico and U.S. territories because the fund focuses on the municipal
securities of U.S. territories, and currently
invests primarily in Puerto Rican municipal securities, events in Puerto Rico are
likely to affect the fund's investments and
its performance. these events may include
economic or political policy changes, tax
base erosion, territory constitutional limits
on tax increases, budget deficits and other
financial difficulties, and changes in the
credit ratings assigned to Puerto Rico's
municipal issuers. as with Puerto Rican
municipal securities, events in any of the
other territories where the fund is invested
may affect the fund's investments and its
performance. certain municipal issuers in
Puerto Rico have recently experienced
financial difficulties.

TABLE 14
COUNT AND PROPORTION OF PuERTO RICO DISCLOSURE LABELS BY

YEAR 2010-2020

~
l

Count
%

'10

'11

'12

'13

'14

'15

'16

'17

'18

'19

'20

'iii
~

E-<

Bespoke: PR warning/default
0

0

0

8

42

59

79

79

68

59

42

436

0

0

0

0

7

25

36

49

52

45

35

26

Boilerplate: General U.S. Territory
Count
%

15

15

19

69

52

49

47

68

82

94

106

616

58

52

61

57

31

30

29

44

54

56

65

46

General PR Territory
Count
%

11

14

12

45

72

55

36

6

1

14

14

280

42

48

39

37

43

34

22

4

1

8

9

21
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D. Additional Analysis: Cosine Similarity
Cosine similarity, a measure of text similarity, 561 also investigates the degree of change between fund's disclosures in
both the public health and the Puerto Rico sample.
For Puerto Rico, this Article compares the year before and
after the SEC issued guidance: 2014/2015 and 2015/2016. For
public health, this Article compares the years 2019 and 2020. For
both the case studies, the filings (based on a unique accession numher) is used as the unit of analysis. This data allows for comparisons
for the same fund, i.e., funds with the same CIK identification
number. The following additional procedures are also used:
Step 1: From accession#, extract the CIK for the fund; for
example, from accession# '0000866841-13-000029', the CIK of
'0000866841' will be extracted;
Step 2: For the same fund, i.e., one CIK number, get all
accession# for the comparison years, public health data between year 2019 and 2020, and Puerto Rico data is between
year 2015 and 2016.
Step 3: For each fund, calculate the cosine similarity for
texts by forming pairs with one CIK from the previous year
(2019/2015) and one CIK from the current year (2020/2016);
Step 4: Find the number of units in previous year, number of units in current year, mean of cosine similarities, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation to list them
in Table 15 and Table 16 for Puerto Rico and Table 17 for
public health data.

For Puerto Rico data, there are 10 matched funds with CIK
listed in the second column of Table 15 and Table 16. This Article
Cosine measurement estimates textual similarity by converting sample
text into a numerical vector representing how many times each word appears
in the text. Words are then weighted by their frequency across all documents
in the sample using term frequency-inverse document frequency ("tf-idf)
method. Tf-IDF minimize the weight of common words and focuses on the
less common language.
The similarity score is calculated as the dot product, or what
can be conceptualized as the cosine of the angle between the
vectors, which can then be interpreted as measures of similarity. Since the cosine yields a number between zero and one,
the measure can be interpreted as a percentage of similarity
or overlap between the compared texts.
McClane, supra note 415, at 223.
661
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treats the 2016 SEC guidance as a natural event study. Disclosures peak in number and specificity (bespoke disclosures) following the release. Comparing the cosine similarity of Puerto
Rico disclosures in 2014-2015 and again in 2015-2016 investigates if there is greater variation in disclosure content following
SEC guidance. This is not what the data show (see Figure 8.)
Cosine variation for Puerto Rico disclosing funds between years
2014-2015 was .87, and .91 between years 2015 and 2016. A score
of 1 indicates that the text is the same and there is no change. A
lower score indicates more change.
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FIGURE 8. PuERTO RICO DISCLOSURE COSINE COMPARISONS
FOR 2014/2015 AND 2015/2016

TABLE 15

COSINE SIMILARITY BETWEEN 2014 AND 2015 FOR
PUERTO RICO DATA
fund_CIK

#_2015

#_2016

mean

median

min

max

stddev

1

0000930413

8

9

0.73

0.71

0.70

0.77

0.03

2

0001193125

66

68

0.75

0.74

0.59

0.78

0.03

3

0000795384

5

6

0.94

0.95

0.89

0.96

0.03

4

0001398344

2

2

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.00

5

0000088053

3

3

0.86

0.84

0.84

0.90

0.04

6

0001206774

12

12

0.87

0.90

0.75

0.90

0.07

7

0001081400

1

1

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.80

NaN

8

0000866841

5

5

0.98

0.98

0.98

0.98

0.00

9

0001133228

3

3

0.71

0.72

0.68

0.72

0.02

10

0000940394

20

22

0.90

0.90

0.84

0.91

0.02
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!'und_CIK

#_2015

#_2016

mean

median

min

max

std dev

11

0001082744

2

2

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.00

12

0000728889

20

20

0.91

0.94

0.84

0.94

0.04

12.25

12.75

0.87

0.87

0.82

0.89

0.03

Total

TABLE

16

COSINE SIMILARITY BETWEEN 2015 AND 2016 FOR
PuERTO RICO DATA
!'und_CIK

#_
2015

#_2016

mean

median

min

max

stddev

1

0000930413

9

9

0.82

0.81

0.77

0.86

0.04

2

0001193125

68

69

0.75

0.77

0.66

0.78

0.03

3

0001398344

2

3

0.82

0.77

0.69

0.99

0.16

4

0000088053

3

3

0.94

0.96

0.91

0.96

0.03

5

0001081400

1

1

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

NaN

6

0000866841

5

5

0.98

0.98

0.98

0.98

0.00

7

0001133228

3

3

0.94

0.95

0.91

0.95

0.03

8

0000940394

22

24

0.93

0.93

0.91

0.95

0.01

9

0001082744

2

2

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.00

10

0000728889

20

20

0.89

0.90

0.81

0.94

0.03

13.50

13.90

0.91

0.91

0.86

0.94

0.04

Total

For public health data, there are twenty-six matching funds
with CIK listed in the second column of Table 17. For these funds,
the histogram is drawn for cosine similarities in Figure 9. The
average cosine similarity score for public health disclosures is
.49, much lower than observed with the Puerto Rico disclosures.
The cosine scores mirror the changes in average sentences in
public disclosures reported in Table 2.
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TABLE 17
COSINE SIMILARITY BETWEEN 2019 AND 2020 FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURES
fund_CIK

#_ 2019

1

0001193126

121

2

0001398344

3

#_

mean

median

min

max

stddev

2924

0.41

0.40

0.17

0.69

0.08

12

261

0.35

0.35

0.19

0.53

0.05

0001445546

6

112

0.41

0.42

0.30

0.72

0.07

4

0000760909

1

1

0.67

0.67

0.67

0.67

NaN

5

0001133228

2

78

0.38

0.36

0.32

0.78

0.08

6

0000914776

2

7

0.64

0.60

0.60

1.00

0.26

7

0001464413

1

9

0.35

0.34

0.34

0.37

0.01

8

0000930413

4

42

0.38

0.37

0.35

0.53

0.03

9

0000827060

1

6

0.26

0.26

0.26

0.26

0.00

10

0000928816

2

3

0.65

0.51

0.49

0.96

0.27

11

0000088063

8

103

0.40

0.39

0.38

0.66

0.04

12

0001288255

1

1

0.70

0.70

0.70

0.70

NaN

13

0001493152

2

3

0.53

0.32

0.31

0.96

0.37

14

0001432363

2

56

0.29

0.31

0.24

0.62

0.06

16

0001379491

3

11

0.50

0.47

0.35

0.94

0.15

16

0000898432

3

45

0.23

0.23

0.15

0.63

0.11

17

0001591556

1

1

0.96

0.96

0.96

0.96

NaN

18

0001162044

1

21

0.27

0.21

0.14

0.68

0.14

19

0000894189

7

223

0.36

0.36

0.23

0.69

0.06

20

0001615774

6

8

0.27

0.24

0.21

0.34

0.05

21

0001635295

2

2

0.75

0.75

0.49

1.00

0.36

22

0001680642

37

116

0.43

0.39

0.13

0.77

0.14

23

0001532747

4

1

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

NaN

24

0001628280

6

16

0.64

0.61

0.33

1.00

0.29

26

0000933691

6

121

0.51

0.48

0.48

0.91

0.10

26

0001104659

10

459

0.42

0.42

0.22

0.68

0.06

9.66

178.04

0.49

0.46

0.38

0.72

0.13

Total

2020
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FIGtmE 9. PtlBLIC HEALTH DISCLOSURE COSINE COMPARISONS

FOR 201912020

